Deontic morality and control /

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This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Haji, Ishtiyaque
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York : Cambridge University Press, ©2002.
Colección:Cambridge studies in philosophy.
Temas:
Free will and determinism.
Ethics.
Duty.
Personal Autonomy
Ethics
Libre arbitre et déterminisme.
Morale.
Devoir.
ethics (philosophy)
PHILOSOPHY > Free Will & Determinism.
Ethik
Determinismus
Willensfreiheit
Pflicht
Deontische Logik
Ethiek.
Vrije wil.
Determinisme.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Two Parallel Riddles
  • Primary Goals
  • Prospectus
  • Determinism and Deontic Morality
  • Obligation and Control
  • Fundamentals of Moral Obligation
  • 'Can' and Obligation
  • Frankfurt-Type Cases and Deontic Control
  • Frankfurt-Type Examples
  • A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Wrong Actions
  • Principle CK and Wrongness
  • The Plausibility of Principles CK and WC
  • A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Deontic Morality
  • An Alternative Argument
  • Control Requirements of Deontic Anchors: Some Objections
  • Objections to K and Replies
  • Frankfurt-Type Cases and K
  • A Widerkerian Objection against K
  • An Objection from Counterintuitiveness
  • Fischer against K
  • A Direct Threat against K from Frankfurt-Type Examples
  • Self-Imposed Impossibility and K
  • Pereboom on OW
  • Genuine Moral Dilemmas and OW
  • Yaffe on K
  • Determinism and Deontic Anchors
  • The Consequence Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Alternative Possibilities
  • Some Objections and Replies
  • Why Determinism Undermines Deontic Anchors
  • Objections to the New Incompatibility Thesis and Replies
  • Saka on 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Determinism
  • Indeterminism and Deontic Morality
  • Transition: From Determinism to Indeterminism
  • Synopsis
  • R-Libertarianism
  • Modest Meleian Libertarianism
  • An Objection and a Reply
  • Modest Meleian Libertarianism and Deontic Anchors
  • Robust Modest R-Libertarianism and Luck
  • Robust Modest R-Libertarianism
  • Robust R-Libertarianism and the Luck Objection.

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