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The significance of consciousness /
Charles Siewert presents a distinctive approach to consciousness that emphasizes our first-person knowledge of experience and argues that we should grant consciousness, understood in this way, a central place in our conception of mind and intentionality. Written in an engaging manner that makes its...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press,
©1998.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction. The project ; A first-person approach ; Guarding against peremptory rejection ; A look ahead.
- First-person knowledge. Attitudes and experience ; Knowledge, belief, and warrant ; Why I am not a Cartesian ; The shape of the argument ; Knowing what one perceives ; A Wittgensteinian challenge ; Solitary self-knowledge ; But do we know our minds?
- Third-person doubts about first-person warrant. Third-person doubts ; Experimental assaults on "privileged access" ; Why third-person investigation will not banish first-person warrant ; Self-knowledge and the eliminativist prospect ; Lingering methodological anxieties.
- Phenomenal consciousness ; How to deny consciousness ; Summary.
- Varieties of consciousness neglect. A test for neglect ; Seeming, judging, and discriminatory talents ; Learning visual judgment ; Inner discrimination, sensory qualities, and higher-order thought ; Consciously seeing is not just thinking you do ; The capacity to use visual information ; Evaluative talents ; Consciousness neglect in functionalism ; Is consciousness a hidden feature? ; Summary.
- Preventing neglect. Seeking rationales for neglect ; Does neuroscience say we are not conscious? ; Is Belinda a metaphysical mistake? ; The warrantability of missing-experience reports ; Fear of skepticism ; Summary.
- Consciousness and self-reflection. Consciousness and self-directedness ; Intentionality and mentally self-directed features ; The "consciousness-of" trap ; Unreflected-on experience ; Unreflective perceivers ; The absence of inner perception ; Summary.
- Visual experience: intentionality and richness. Can we take the intentional out of the phenomenal? ; Framing the issue ; Is the phenomenal holistic enough to be intentional? ; Sense-data inflated (and exploded) ; Sensory intentionality is not bestowed by judgment ; Might essential environmental and behavioral links be missing? ; The intentionality of color experience ; Visual experience: untold riches ; Other forms of phenomenal visual wealth ; Summary.
- Conscious thought. Conscious thought
- iconic and noniconic ; Intentionality and visualization ; Consciousness thought: not just imagery ; The relation of phenomenal and intentional differences in thought ; Thought's seeming: inseparable from thought ; Conclusion.
- The importance of consciousness. Does consciousness matter? ; Experience for its own sake ; The importance of being conscious ; Should we care so much about consciousness? ; But must we talk about it? ; Conclusion.