The myth of morality /

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"In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgments is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. Joyce argues that natural selection is to bla...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Joyce, Richard, 1966-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Colección:Cambridge studies in philosophy.
Temas:
Ethics.
Morale.
ethics (philosophy)
PHILOSOPHY > Social.
PHILOSOPHY > Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
Ethics
Ethik
Fiktion
Moraal.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • 1 Error theory and motivation
  • 1.0 FAULTY FRAMEWORKS
  • 1.1 THE SEMANTICS OF AN ERROR THEORY
  • 1.2 NONCOGNITIVISM
  • 1.3 MACKIE'S ERROR THEORY
  • 1.4 INTERNALISM ABOUT MOTIVATION
  • 1.5 PURE EVIL
  • 1.6 MOTIVATION INTERNALISM AS A COMMITMENT OF MORAL DISCOURSE
  • 1.7 IMPASSE
  • 2 Error theory and reasons
  • 2.0 MORAL INESCAPABILITY
  • 2.1 INSTITUTIONAL OUGHT''S
  • 2.2 STRONG CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES AS REASON-BRINGING
  • 2.3 INSTITUTIONAL REASONS
  • 2.4 AN ARGUMENT FOR A MORAL ERROR THEORY
  • 2.5 CARNAP'S ARGUMENT AGAINST EXTERNAL QUESTIONING
  • 2.6 PRACTICAL REASONS AS NON-INSTITUTIONAL
  • 3 Practical instrumentalism
  • 3.0 OBJECTIVE REASONS, SUBJECTIVE REASONS, AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
  • OBJECTIVE REASONS:
  • SUBJECTIVE REASONS:
  • INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY:
  • 3.1 ENDS: DESIRES OR INTERESTS?
  • 3.2 MORALITY AS A SYSTEM OF HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES
  • 3.3 SMITH'S ARGUMENT FOR MORALITY AS A SYSTEM OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES
  • 3.4 SMITH'S ARGUMENT FOR MOTIVATION INTERNALISM
  • 3.5 TAKING STOCK OF THE STRATEGY
  • 3.6 THE NON-HUMEAN THEORY OF NORMATIVE REASONS
  • 3.7 RATIONALITY AND EPISTEMIC SUCCESS
  • 3.8 NORMATIVE REASONS AND MORAL REASONS
  • 3.9 SUMMARY AND PREVIEW
  • 4 The relativity of reasons
  • 4.0 THE RATIONALIST'S DILEMMA
  • 4.1 THE RELATIVITY OF NORMATIVE REASONS: THE CONCEPTUAL QUESTION
  • 4.2 THE RELATIVITY OF NORMATIVE REASONS: THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION
  • 4.3 HARMAN'S MURDER, INCORPORATED
  • 4.4 MORAL RELATIVISM
  • 4.5 SUMMARY AND PREVIEW
  • 5 Internal and external reasons
  • 5.0 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REASONS
  • 5.1 EXTERNAL REASONS AND MOTIVATION
  • 5.2 MILLGRAM'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS
  • 5.3 HAMPTON'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS
  • 5.4 KORSGAARD'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS
  • 5.5 SUMMARY
  • 6 Morality and evolution
  • 6.0 THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: HELPING KIN
  • 6.1 THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: RECIPROCAL HELPING
  • 6.2 EVOLUTIONARY ETHICAL NATURALISM
  • 6.3 EVOLUTIONARY ETHICAL NATURALISM AND THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY
  • 6.4 MORAL GENEALOGY, MORAL ERROR, AND THE GENETIC FALLACY
  • 6.5 UNJUSTIFIED MORAL JUDGMENTS VS. PROBABLY FALSE MORAL JUDGMENTS
  • 6.6 SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
  • 7 Fictionalism
  • 7.0 IF THERE'S NOTHING THAT WE OUGHT TO DO, THEN WHAT OUGHT WE TO DO?
  • 7.1 WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF MORAL BELIEFS?
  • 7.2 THE FICTIONALIST OPTION
  • 7.3 FICTIVE JUDGMENTS: VAIHINGER
  • 7.4 FICTIVE JUDGMENTS: CRITICAL CONTEXTS
  • 7.5 FICTIONALISM AND MAKE-BELIEVE
  • 7.6 FICTIONALISM AND METAETHICS
  • 7.7 CONCLUSION
  • 8 Moral fictionalism
  • 8.0 THE VALUE OF MORAL BELIEFS
  • 8.1 MORALITY AS FICTION
  • 8.2 THE RETURN OF GYGES AND THE SENSIBLE KNAVE
  • 8.3 ODYSSEUS AND THE SIRENS
  • 8.4 A MODEST CONCLUSION
  • Epilogue: Debunking myths
  • Select bibliography.

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