What minds can do : intentionality in a non-intentional world /
Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
1997.
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Colección: | Cambridge studies in philosophy.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction
- pt. I. The naturalization of intentionality. What is intentional realism?
- Introduction to informational semantics
- Three problems for informational semantics
- Information and teleology
- pt. II. The causal role of intentionality. The computational representational theory of mind (CRTM)
- Must an intentional realist be a meaning atomist?
- Functionalism and the threat of preemption
- Explaining intentional behavior
- Conclusion: a postlude on semantics and psychology.