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Inductive inference and its natural ground : an essay in naturalistic epistemology /

Hilary Kornblith presents an account of inductive inference that addresses both its metaphysical and epistemological aspects. He argues that inductive knowledge is possible by virtue of the fit between our innate psychological capacities and the causal structure of the world.Kornblith begins by deve...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Kornblith, Hilary (author .)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©1993.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

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245 1 0 |a Inductive inference and its natural ground :  |b an essay in naturalistic epistemology /  |c Hilary Kornblith. 
260 |a Cambridge, Mass. :  |b MIT Press,  |c ©1993. 
300 |a 1 online resource (x, 123 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
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500 |a "A Bradford book." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 115-119) and index. 
500 |a 'Material from W.V. Quine ... ' -- t. p. verso. 
505 0 0 |g Ch. 1  |t The Naturalistic Project in Epistemology  |g (starting p. 1) --  |g 1.1  |t Epistemology as a Part of Natural Science  |g (starting p. 2) --  |g 1.2  |t The Importance of Natural Kinds  |g (starting p. 5) --  |g 1.3  |t Our Psychological Constitution  |g (starting p. 7) --  |g Pt. I  |t What Is the World That We May Know It? --  |g Ch. 2  |t Locke and Natural Kinds  |g (starting p. 13) --  |g 2.1  |t What Is the Issue?  |g (starting p. 13) --  |g 2.2  |t Three Views  |g (starting p. 16) --  |g 2.3  |t Two Arguments for Conventionalism  |g (starting p. 18) --  |g 2.4  |t Two Kinds of Conventionalism?  |g (starting p. 21) --  |g 2.5  |t The Official View  |g (starting p. 23) --  |g 2.6  |t Two Kinds of Skepticism about Real Essence  |g (starting p. 25) --  |g 2.7  |t Knowledge of Real Essence  |g (starting p. 30) --  |g Ch. 3  |t Real Kinds in Nature  |g (starting p. 35) --  |g 3.1  |t Boyd's Account of Natural Kinds: Homeostatic Property Clusters  |g (starting p. 35) --  |g 3.2  |t All Their Properties in Common?  |g (starting p. 36) --  |g 3.3  |t Merely Postponing the Problem?  |g (starting p. 40) --  |g 3.4  |t Conventionalism Again  |g (starting p. 43) --  |g 3.5  |t Kinds in the Special Sciences  |g (starting p. 47) --  |g 3.6  |t And Not Token Identical Either  |g (starting p. 52) --  |g Pt. II  |t What Are We That We May Know the World? --  |g Ch. 4  |t Concepts and Kinds  |g (starting p. 61) --  |g 4.1  |t Superficial Similarities  |g (starting p. 61) --  |g 4.2  |t Same Appearance versus Same Kind  |g (starting p. 64) --  |g 4.3  |t Outsides and Insides: Where the Essences Are  |g (starting p. 67) --  |g 4.4  |t Psychological Essentialism and Its Innateness: Preliminary Considerations  |g (starting p. 70) --  |g 4.5  |t Innate Constraints on Syntax and Innate Constraints on Concepts  |g (starting p. 74) --  |g 4.6  |t Directions for Future Research  |g (starting p. 78) --  |g Ch. 5  |t Our Native Inferential Tendencies  |g (starting p. 83) --  |g 5.1  |t Inferential Error and Perceptual Error  |g (starting p. 84) --  |g 5.2  |t The Law of Small Numbers  |g (starting p. 87) --  |g 5.3  |t Predictions Based on the Law of Small Numbers  |g (starting p. 91) --  |g 5.4  |t The Standards of Statistical Inference  |g (starting p. 92) --  |g 5.5  |t Small Numbers and Natural Kinds: what Needs to Be Shown  |g (starting p. 94) --  |g 5.6  |t Detection of Covariation: The Bad News  |g (starting p. 96) --  |g 5.7  |t Detection of Covariation: The Good News  |g (starting p. 100) --  |g 5.8  |t Projecting the Right Features of Natural Kinds  |g (starting p. 105). 
520 |a Hilary Kornblith presents an account of inductive inference that addresses both its metaphysical and epistemological aspects. He argues that inductive knowledge is possible by virtue of the fit between our innate psychological capacities and the causal structure of the world.Kornblith begins by developing an account of natural kinds that has its origins in John Locke's work on real and nominal essences. In Kornblith's view, a natural kind is a stable cluster of properties that are bound together in nature. The existence of such kinds serves as a natural ground of inductive inference.Kornblith then examines two features of human psychology that explain how knowledge of natural kinds is attained. First, our concepts are structured innately in a way that presupposes the existence of natural kinds. Second, our native inferential tendencies tend to provide us with accurate beliefs about the world when applied to environments that are populated by natural kinds. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
546 |a English. 
590 |a eBooks on EBSCOhost  |b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide 
600 1 4 |a Quine, W. V.  |q (Willard Van Orman),  |d 1908-2000. 
650 0 |a Naturalism. 
650 0 |a Knowledge, Theory of. 
650 0 |a Induction (Logic) 
650 0 |a Inference. 
650 6 |a Naturalisme. 
650 6 |a Théorie de la connaissance. 
650 6 |a Induction (Logique) 
650 6 |a Inférence (Logique) 
650 7 |a naturalism (philosophical movement)  |2 aat 
650 7 |a epistemology.  |2 aat 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Epistemology.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Induction (Logic)  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Inference  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Knowledge, Theory of  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Naturalism  |2 fast 
650 1 7 |a Kennistheorie.  |2 gtt 
650 1 7 |a Naturalisme (filosofie)  |0 (NL-LeOCL)078600073  |2 gtt 
650 7 |a Philosophy.  |2 hilcc 
650 7 |a Philosophy & Religion.  |2 hilcc 
653 |a PSYCHOLOGY / Cognitive Psychology 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Kornblith, Hilary.  |t Inductive inference and its natural ground.  |d Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©1993  |z 0262111756  |w (DLC) 92035861  |w (OCoLC)26973678 
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