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An Austro-Libertarian Critique of Public Choice

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: DiLorenzo, Thomas J.
Otros Autores: Block, Walter E.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York : Romanian Institute of Orthodox Theology and Spirituality, 2016.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Front Cover
  • Half Title
  • Editorial Advisory Board
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgements
  • Introduction
  • Part 1: What Is Austrian Economics?
  • Chapter 1 The Subjectivist Roots of James Buchanan's Economics
  • Chapter 2 Cultural Dynamics
  • Part 2: The Austrian Critique of Public Choice
  • Chapter 3 Competition and Political Entrepreneurship: Austrian Insights into Public-Choice Theory
  • Chapter 4 Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics
  • Chapter 5 George Stigler and the Myth of Efficient Government
  • Part 3: The Austrian Response to The Calculus of Consent
  • Chapter 6 The Calculus of Consent Revisited
  • Chapter 7 Buchanan and Tullock's "The Calculus of Consent"
  • Chapter 8 Constitutional Economics and the Calculus of Consent
  • Part 4: Austrians and Public Choicers on Antitrust
  • Chapter 9 The Truth about Sherman
  • Chapter 10 The Myth of Natural Monopoly
  • Chapter 11 Monopolistic Competition and Macroeconomic Theory by Robert Solow
  • Chapter 12 The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective
  • Chapter 13 Total Repeal of Antitrust Legislation: A Critique of Bork, Brozen, and Posner
  • Part 5: Rent Seeking
  • Chapter 14 Property Rights, Information Costs, and the Economics of Rent Seeking
  • Chapter 15 All Government is Excessive: A Rejoinder to Dwight Lee's "In Defense of Excessive Government"
  • Chapter 16 Watch Your Language
  • Part 6: Taxation
  • Chapter 17 Utility Profits, Fiscal Illusion, and Local Public Expenditures
  • Chapter 18 The Expenditure Effects of Restricting Competition in Local Public Service Industries: The Case of Special Districts
  • Chapter 19 The Justification for Taxation in the Public Finance Literature: An Unorthodox View
  • Part 7: Other Topics in Public Choice
  • Chapter 20 A Constitutionalist Approach to Social Security Reform
  • Chapter 21 The Futility of Bureaucracy
  • Chapter 22 Government and Market: A Critique of Professor James Buchanan's "What Should Economists" Do?
  • Chapter 23 Economic Competition and Political Competition: An Empirical Note
  • Chapter 24 An Empirical Assessment of the Factor-Supplier Pressure Group Hypothesis
  • Back Cover