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Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Intro
  • Title Page
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • List of Figures and Tables
  • Preface and Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • 1. Compliance and Enforcement
  • 2. Measuring Tax Compliance in Chile and Argentina
  • 3. Taxpayers' Perceptions of Government Enforcement
  • 4. General Deterrence: Impunity and Sanctions in Taxation
  • 5. Specific Deterrence and Its Effects on Individual Compliance
  • 6. The Role of Trust, Reciprocity, and Solidarity in Tax Compliance
  • 7. Social Mechanisms in Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance
  • Conclusion: Tax Compliance and the Law
  • Appendix A: On the Data
  • Appendix B: A Game Theory Approach to the Logic of Tax Compliance
  • Appendix C: A Simulative Game: The Effects of Enforcement
  • Appendix D: The State, the Law, and the Rule of Law
  • Notes
  • References
  • Index
  • Back Cover