Corporate Takeover, Management Discipline and the Law

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Okanigbuan Jnr, Francis A.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Milton : Routledge, 2019.
Colección:Routledge Research in Corporate Law Ser.
Temas:
Consolidation and merger of corporations > Law and legislation > Great Britain.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Half Title
  • Series Page
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Table of cases
  • Table of statutes
  • PART I
  • 1 General introduction
  • 1.1 Introduction
  • 1.2 The persistent challenges of corporate acquisition
  • 1.3 Theoretical perspectives of takeovers
  • 1.4 Aim and scope
  • 1.5 Outline
  • 2 The regulatory framework of institutions
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 The neo-classical economics and the old institutional economics theories
  • 2.3 The framework of the new institutional economics
  • 2.4 Institutions: levels of development and change
  • 2.5 Main streams in economics of institutions
  • 2.5.1 Property rights of shareholders
  • 2.5.3 Agency relationship between managements and shareholders
  • 2.5.3 Agency relationship between managements and shareholders
  • 2.6 How institutions can influence market discipline
  • 2.7 Conclusion
  • 3 The theoretical framework of corporate takeovers
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Types of corporate takeovers: nature and characteristics
  • 3.3 The takeover devices
  • 3.3.1 Direct purchase of shares (tender offer or open market bid)
  • 3.3.2 Proxy contests
  • 3.4 The takeover hypotheses and justification for takeovers
  • 3.4.1 The disciplinary hypothesis
  • 3.4.2 The synergy hypothesis
  • 3.4.3 The hubris hypothesis
  • 3.5 Takeover defences
  • 3.6 Contractual relationships: agency conflicts and employment issues
  • 3.6.1 Agency conflicts
  • 3.6.2 Employment issues
  • 3.6.3 The contractual theory of the corporation
  • 3.6.4 The entity theory of the corporation
  • 3.7 Conclusion
  • PART II
  • 4 Takeover regulation in the United Kingdom
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 The historical development of takeover regulation in the United Kingdom
  • 4.3 Shareholder protection
  • 4.3.1 Shareholders of target companies
  • 4.3.2 Shareholders of acquiring companies
  • i) Are shareholders of acquiring companies protected from opportunistic behaviour of management?
  • ii) Do shareholders of acquiring companies always record gains from takeovers?
  • iii) Derivative action and personal actions by shareholders of acquiring companies
  • 4.4 Employment protection
  • 4.4.1 The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE)
  • 4.5 Conclusion
  • 5 The regulatory framework for takeovers in the United States (Delaware)
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 The historical development of takeover regulation
  • 5.3 Shareholders of target companies
  • 5.3.1 The Williams Act of 1968
  • 5.3.2 Target shareholder protection in Delaware
  • a) Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Company
  • b) Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc.
  • 5.4 Shareholders of acquiring companies
  • 5.4.1 Managerial conflict of interests
  • a) Market power
  • b) Competition among bidders
  • c) Managerial hubris
  • corporate size
  • 5.5 Costly acquisitions and employee dismissal
  • 5.6 Conclusion

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