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Modern Energy Market Manipulation.
This book explores the important economic and legal questionsof market manipulation that have arisen in restructured energy markets, paying particular attention to the actions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Bingley :
Emerald Publishing Limited,
2018.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Intro; Modern Energy Market Manipulation; Contents; About the Author; Acknowledgments; Preface; References; Chapter 1: What is Manipulation? What is Not Manipulation?; I. Introduction; II. A Commodity Market; A. Selling to the Commodity Market; B. Buying from the Exchange; C. Challenges for the Exchange; D. Challenges for the Commodity Trader; III. Defining Manipulation; IV. Speculation, Arbitrage, and Market Power; References; Chapter 2: Economic Theories of Manipulation; I. Introduction; II. Two (Relatively) Early Works; III. Pirrong Creates a Field; IV. Works by Ledgerwood and Coauthors.
- v. ConclusionReferences; Chapter 3: Some Historical Manipulation Cases, or Understanding Why the Hunt Brothers Did Not Manipulate the Silver Market; I. Introduction; II. General Foods v. Brannan (1948); III. Great Western v. Brannan (1953); 4. H.W. Miller and Company v. Benson (1958); V. Volkart Brothers (1962); 6. Cargill v. Harden (1971); VII. The Hunt Brothers Silver Escapade; VIII. Concluding Thoughts; References; Chapter 4: DiPlacido: the CFTC Confuses Manipulation and Hedging; I. Introduction; II. The Parties and the Procedure; B. The Process at an Administrative Agency.
- C. Weaknesses of the ProcedureIII. The Contending Theories; A. Options and How to Hedge with Them; B. The Manipulation Theory; C. The Available Evidence; IV. The CFTC's Path to a Manipulation Finding; A. Showing an Artificial Price; B. Violating Bids: The Crux of the CFTC's Decision; 1. Motives for Violating Bidders; 2. Were Bidders Violated, and If So, So What?; C. Misconstruing Henner; D. Motive Is Not Necessary; or Misconstruing Cargill; V. The Bad Words; VI. Final Thoughts: Deference Does Not Seem to be Appropriate; References; Chapter 5: Introduction to Electricity Markets.
- I. IntroductionII. Restructured Electricity Markets; B. Regional Transmission Organizations; III. The Three-node Model; B. Supply and Demand; IV. Other Markets; A. Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets; B. Financial Transmission Rights; C. Ancillary Markets; V. Some Concluding Thoughts; References; Chapter 6: Were California's Electricity Markets Manipulated, and by Whom?; I. Introduction; II. Electricity Restructuring in California; A. Price Caps and Finger Pointing; III. ENRON; B. ENRON in the California Crisis; IV. Congestion-Related Strategies; A. Load Shifting; B. Death Star and Cut Schedules.
- v. An Ancillary Market Strategy
- "Get Shorty"VI. Why were Real-Time Prices Higher than Day-Ahead Prices?; VII. Interpreting Price Arbitrage Strategies; A. "Ricochet"; 2. Economic Analysis of Ricochet; B. Overgeneration and Fat Boy; VIII. Gaming; IX. Conclusion; References; Chapter 7: Deutsche Bank: What should the Legal Rule for Trading Financial Transmission Rights be?; I. Introduction; II. The Prosecution's Case; B. The Proceedings and FERC Staff's Arguments; III. Deutsche Bank's Arguments; A. Deutsche Bank's Motivation; B. Why Did Deutsche Bank Lose Money?