Cargando…

Enforcing fire safety in the catering industry : an economic analysis /

Annotation

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Suurmond, G. (Guido)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Leiden : Leiden University Press, ©2008.
Colección:LUP Meijersreeks Ser.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000Ma 4500
001 EBOOKCENTRAL_ocn992098041
003 OCoLC
005 20240329122006.0
006 m o d
007 cr cn|||||||||
008 081016s2008 ne ob 001 0 eng d
040 |a PIFAG  |b eng  |e pn  |c PIFAG  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCF  |d AGLDB  |d OCLCQ  |d U3W  |d STF  |d WRM  |d OCLCQ  |d NRAMU  |d EZ9  |d VT2  |d AU@  |d WYU  |d OCLCQ  |d TKN  |d OCLCQ  |d VLY  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCL 
019 |a 842578553  |a 1162536493  |a 1241898127  |a 1290101245  |a 1300492228 
020 |z 9789087280611 
020 |z 9789048508129 
020 |a 1282401874 
020 |a 9781282401877 
020 |a 9786612401879 
020 |a 6612401877 
020 |a 9048508126 
020 |a 9789048508129 
020 |a 9087280610 
020 |a 9789087280611 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000050960671 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000062462661 
035 |a (OCoLC)992098041  |z (OCoLC)842578553  |z (OCoLC)1162536493  |z (OCoLC)1241898127  |z (OCoLC)1290101245  |z (OCoLC)1300492228 
037 |b 00118848 
050 4 |a TH9145  |b .S88 2008eb 
082 0 4 |a 340-349 
049 |a UAMI 
100 1 |a Suurmond, G.  |q (Guido)  |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjt8WkPjydP3McwpXjBhQC 
245 1 0 |a Enforcing fire safety in the catering industry :  |b an economic analysis /  |c G. Suurmond. 
260 |a Leiden :  |b Leiden University Press,  |c ©2008. 
300 |a 1 online resource (xi, 384 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a LUP Meijersreeks Ser. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0 |a Content; 1. Introduction; Part 1: Theory; 2. The social problem and the optimal solution: Why enforcement is needed; 3. Introduction to public law enforcement: detection and sanctions; 4. Continuing compliance and enduring enforcement -- time constraints; 5. Partial compliance and targeting enforcement -- resource constraints; 6. Flexible compliance and cooperative enforcement -- information constraints; 7. Voluntary compliance and persuading enforcement -- informal constraints; 8. Economic explanations of compliance strategies. 
505 8 |a 9. Discretion, credibility and objectives of the enforcement authority10. The optimal structure of law enforcement; Part 2: Empirical Analysis; 11. Fire safety regulation in horeca establishments and policy developments; 12. Analyzing current municipal enforcement policies: Which strategy is effective?; 13. Cost-benefit analysis of enforcement following the Volendam disaster; 14. Settlement of liability claims following the Volendam disaster; 15. Efficient enforcement in a representative municipality; 16. Conclusion; Appendix 1: Interviews and interviewees; Samenvatting; References; Index. 
520 8 |a Annotation  |b On New Year's Eve 2001, fourteen youngsters were killed and more than two hundred got injured by a fire in a bar in the municipality of Volendam in the Netherlands.After this tragic event, the Dutch government intensified the administrative law enforcement of the fire safety regulation, especially in the catering industry. From an economic and social perspective important questions can be raised on this response to the 'Volendam disaster'.Are the costs and benefits of enforcement properly balanced? What effects on compliance can be expected from administrative law enforcement? Is private enforcement by liability claims of victims considered as an alternative? The main question of this thesis is:What is an effective and efficient enforcement policy for fire safety in the catering industry? In particular, this thesis discusses whether the use of informal, cooperative enforcement through warnings, persuasion and advice (a so called compliance strategy) is effective in inducing compliance with the fire safety regulation.The standard economic model of compliance and enforcement stresses the importance of immediately punishing individuals and firms for non-compliance (a deterrence strategy). In practice many administrative law enforcement officials do not impose the strict sanctions economists promote. Part I of this thesis analyzes the economic literature to discuss whether and when a compliance strategy can be beneficial. It discusses which enforcement method (private, administrative or criminal) is effective and efficient to enforce safety standards. Definite conclusions on the optimal enforcement policy can only be drawn by analyzing the actual data.Therefore, part II of this thesis analyzes which enforcement policy is effective and efficient for the case of fire safety in the catering industry in the Netherlands. Enforcement officials have been interviewed to examine the use of a compliance strategy.The benefits and costs of the enforcement efforts after the Volendam disaster are estimated to see whether these efforts have been a desirable investment. Also, the compensation of the victims of the Volendam disaster is investigated to analyze the incentive to take precautions. Finally, a simulation of different enforcement policies in a representative municipality examines which policy is efficient. This is a volume in the series of the E.M. Meijers Institute for Legal Research of the Faculty of Law at Leiden This title can be previewed in Google Books - http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN9789087280611. 
546 |a English. 
590 |a eBooks on EBSCOhost  |b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide 
590 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b Ebook Central Academic Complete 
650 0 |a Fire prevention. 
650 0 |a Caterers and catering. 
650 6 |a Incendies  |x Prévention. 
650 6 |a Traiteurs. 
650 7 |a fire prevention.  |2 aat 
650 7 |a Caterers and catering  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Fire prevention  |2 fast 
776 |z 90-8728-061-0 
830 0 |a LUP Meijersreeks Ser. 
856 4 0 |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3327144  |z Texto completo 
994 |a 92  |b IZTAP