Protection of substation critical equipment against intentional electromagnetic threats /

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The modern microprocessor based electronic equipment most vulnerable to Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Interferences (IDEI) includes High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) in all substation equipment. However, power equipment and especially transformers are also subject to the influence...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Gurevich, Vladimir, 1956-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Chichester, West Sussex : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2017.
Temas:
Electric power systems > Protection.
Shielding (Electricity)
Electric power distribution > Security measures.
Electric substations > Protection.
Réseaux électriques (Énergie) > Protection.
Blindage (Électricité)
Postes de réseau électrique > Protection.
TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING > Mechanical.
Electric power systems > Protection
Electric substations > Protection
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Intro
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Contents
  • About the Author
  • Preface
  • Chapter 1 Technical Progress and Its Consequences: The Philosophy Behind Technical Progress
  • 1.1 Technical Progress in Relay Protection
  • 1.2 Microprocessors
  • The Basis of the Contemporary Stage of Technical Progress
  • 1.3 Smart Grid
  • A Dangerous Vector of 'Technical Progress' in Power Engineering
  • 1.4 Dangerous Trends in the Development of Relay Protection Equipment
  • References
  • Chapter 2 Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Threats
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 A Brief Historical Background
  • 2.3 The First Reliable Information on HEMP as Well as Protection Methods in the Field of Electrical Power Engineering
  • 2.4 The Actual Situation with Respect to the Protection of Power Electrical Systems from HEMP and other Types of Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Threats
  • 2.5 Medium and Short-Range Missile Systems
  • Potential Sources of Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Threats that Anti-Missile Defence Systems Are Powerless to Defend Against
  • 2.6 What is Needed to Actually Defend the Country Against an 'Electromagnetic Armageddon'?
  • 2.7 The Classification and Specifics of High Power Electromagnetic Threats
  • 2.8 The Effect of HPEM on Microprocessor-based Relay Protection Systems
  • 2.9 The Principle Technical Standards in the HEMP Field
  • References
  • Chapter 3 Methods and Techniques of Protecting DPR from EMP
  • 3.1 The Sensitivity of DPR to Electromagnetic Threats
  • 3.2 Methods of Protection from HEMP
  • References
  • Chapter 4 Passive Methods and Techniques of Protecting DPR from EMP
  • 4.1 Cabinets
  • 4.2 The Earthing of Sensitive Electronic Apparatus
  • 4.3 HEMP Filters
  • 4.3.1 Ferrite Filters
  • 4.3.2 LC Section-based Filters
  • 4.4 Non-linear Overvoltage Limiters
  • 4.5 Shielding of the Control Cables.
  • 4.6 Design Changes to DPR
  • 4.6.1 Analogue Input Points
  • 4.6.2 Discrete Input Points
  • 4.6.3 Output Relays
  • 4.6.4 Printed Boards
  • 4.7 Construction Materials
  • References
  • Chapter 5 Active Methods and Techniques of Protecting DPR from EMP
  • 5.1 A New Principle in the Active Protection of DPR
  • 5.2 Current and Voltage Sensors with Regulated Pickup Threshold based on Reed Switches
  • 5.3 Technical and Economic Aspects Affecting the Active Methods of Protecting DPR
  • 5.4 Protecting the Circuit Breaker Remote Control System
  • References
  • Chapter 6 Testing the DPR Immunity to HPEM
  • 6.1 An Analysis of Sources of HPEM
  • 6.2 The Parameters of Testing DPR for Immunity to HEMP
  • 6.3 The Parameters for Testing Immunity to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI)
  • 6.4 Testing Equipment for Testing Immunity to HPEM
  • 6.5 Use of the Performance Criteria During Testing of Electronic Apparatus for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
  • 6.6 The Idiosyncrasies of using Performance Criteria during Testing of Microprocessor Based Relay Protection Devices for their Immunity to HPEM
  • 6.7 A critique of the Method of Testing of the DPR Used in [6.16]
  • 6.8 An Analysis of the Results of the Second Independent Test of a DPR of the Same Type
  • 6.9 Conclusions and Recommendations for Testing Microprocessor Based Protective Relays
  • References
  • Chapter 7 Administrative and Technical Measures to Protect DPR from EMP
  • 7.1 Problems with the Standardization of DPR
  • 7.1.1 Who Coordinates the Process of Standardization in the Field of Relay Protection?
  • 7.1.2 The Fundamental Principles of the Standardization of DPR
  • 7.2 The Fundamental Principles for the Standardization of DPR Testing
  • 7.2.1 A New Look at the Problem
  • 7.2.2 Modern Testing Systems to Test Protective Relays.
  • 7.2.3 The Problems with Modern Protective Relay Testing Systems
  • 7.2.4 A Proposed Solution to the Problem
  • 7.3 Establishment of Reserves of Electronic Equipment Replacement Modules as a Way to Improve the Survivability of the Power System
  • 7.3.1 Optimizing the Capacity of Reserves of Replacement Modules
  • 7.3.2 The Problem of Storing SPTA Reserves
  • References
  • Chapter 8 Protecting High-Power Electrical Equipment from EMP
  • 8.1 The Magneto-Hydrodynamic Effect of HEMP
  • 8.2 The Influence of the E3 HEMP Component on High-Power Electrical Equipment
  • 8.3 Protection of High-Power Equipment from the Impact of Geo-Magnetically Induced Currents (GIC)
  • References
  • Appendix: EMP and its Impact on the Power System
  • List of Reports
  • I. EMP Theory
  • II. Geomagnetically Induced Currents and its Impact on Power System
  • III. EMP Impact on Power System
  • Index
  • EULA.

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