Cargando…
The Theory of Mixed Oligopoly : Privatization, Transboundary Activities, and Their Applications.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Tokyo :
Springer Japan,
2016.
|
| Colección: | New frontiers in regional science: Asian perspectives.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Preface; Contents; Part I: Basic Frameworks; Chapter 1: Basic Properties of a Mixed Oligopoly Model; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Basic Mixed Oligopoly Model; 1.3 Partial Privatization; 1.4 Free-Entry Equilibrium and the Privatization Problem; 1.5 Entry Restriction and Partial Privatization; 1.6 Concluding Remarks; References; Chapter 2: Equilibrium and the Adjustment Process in a Mixed Oligopoly: A Graphical Explanation; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Model; 2.3 Graphical Explanation; 2.3.1 From the First to the Third Periods; 2.3.2 From the Period to Equilibrium; 2.3.3 n Firms Case.
- 2.4 Concluding RemarksReferences; Chapter 3: Privatization in a Stackelberg Mixed Oligopoly; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Model; 3.3 When a Public Firm Acts as a Stackelberg Leader; 3.3.1 Before Privatization; 3.3.2 After Privatization; 3.3.3 Social Welfare Comparison When a Public Firm Acts as a Leader; 3.4 When a Public Firm Acts as a Stackelberg Follower; 3.4.1 Before Privatization; 3.4.2 After Privatization; 3.4.3 Social Welfare Comparison When a Public Firm Acts as a Follower; 3.5 Social Welfare Comparison Before Privatization; 3.6 Concluding Remarks; Appendix.
- A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2; A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3; References; Chapter 4: Physical Capital Accumulation and Partial Privatization; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Model; 4.3 Dynamic Optimization; 4.3.1 The Maximization Problem of the Private Firm; 4.3.2 The Maximization Problem of the Public Firm; 4.3.3 Local Stability; 4.4 Dynamic Optimal Privatization Ratio; 4.4.1 Demand-Driven Equilibrium; 4.4.2 The Ramsey Output of the Public Firm; 4.4.3 Ramsey Output of the Private Firm; 4.5 Discussion and Remaining Issues; Appendix.
- A.4.1 Derivation of the Reaction Function of Private FirmsA. 4.2 Derivation of the Reaction Function of the Public Firm; References; Chapter 5: International Mixed Oligopoly; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 The Model; 5.2.1 Partial Privatization in a Regulated Market; 5.2.2 Partial Privatization in a Free-Entry Equilibrium; 5.2.3 Excess Entry and Privatization; 5.2.4 Optimal Entry Tax; 5.3 Strategic Trade Policy and Privatization; 5.4 Harmonization Problem; 5.4.1 Segmented Market; 5.4.2 Integrated Market; 5.5 Conclusion; References; Part II: Policies.
- Chapter 6: Optimal Partial Privatization in an International Mixed Oligopoly Under Various Tax Principles6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The Model and Preliminary Results; 6.3 Optimal Partial Privatization Under Various Tax Principles; 6.4 Welfare Comparisons; 6.5 Concluding Remarks; Appendix; A.6.1 Stability Condition; A.6.2 Proof of Lemma 6.2; A.6.3 Proof of Proposition 6.3; A.6.4 Proof of Proposition 6.6; References; Chapter 7: Privatization Neutrality Theorem When a Public Firm Maximizes Objectives Other than Social Welfare; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 The Model.