Cargando…
Regional free trade areas and strategic trade policies /
This book presents a theoretical investigation of the formation of regional free trade agreements (FTAs), the behavior of global enterprises, and government trade policies in various game forms including multi-stage games, repeated games, and timing games. In the last few decades, the number of FTAs...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | , , , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Japan :
Springer Nature,
2016.
|
| Colección: | New frontiers in regional science: Asian perspectives ;
vol. 10. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Preface; Contents; Part I The Formation of Free Trade Agreements; 1 Expansion of Free Trade Agreements, Overlapping Free Trade Agreements, and Market Size; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 The Model; 1.3 Preliminary Results; 1.3.1 Initial Situation: No FTA; 1.3.2 Feasibility of Bilateral FTA; 1.4 Analysis; 1.4.1 Overlapping Regime; 1.4.1.1 Hub-and-Spoke System; 1.4.1.2 Spoke-Spoke FTA; 1.4.2 Expanding Regime; 1.5 Feasibility of MFT Under Overlapping Regime and Expanding Regime; 1.6 Concluding Remarks; References.
- 2 The Feasibility of Multilateral Free Trade and Mode of Competition: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Competitions2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Model; 2.3 Analysis; 2.3.1 Initial Situation: No FTA; 2.3.2 Overlapping Regime; 2.3.2.1 The First-Round Negotiation: Bilateral FTA; 2.3.2.2 Hub-and-Spoke System; 2.3.2.3 Spoke-Spoke FTA; 2.3.3 Expanding Regime; 2.3.3.1 Bilateral FTA; 2.3.3.2 Expansion of Bilateral FTA; 2.4 Comparison of Stackelberg with Cournot Competition; 2.5 Concluding Remarks; References; 3 Sustainability of Free Trade Agreements Under a Maximum Revenue Tariff; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Setup.
- 3.3 Preliminary Results3.3.1 Welfare-Maximizing Tariff Game; 3.3.2 Maximum Revenue Tariff Game; 3.3.3 Free Trade; 3.3.4 Equilibrium Outcomes; 3.4 Sustainability for MFT Under No FTA; 3.4.1 Sustainability of MFT Under a Welfare-Maximizing Tariff; 3.4.2 Sustainability of MFT Under a Maximum Revenue Tariff; 3.4.3 Comparison of Sustainable Conditions; 3.5 Sustainability of an FTA Under No FTA; 3.5.1 External Tariff Rate; 3.5.2 Sustainability of an FTA Under a Welfare-Maximizing Tariff Regime; 3.5.3 Sustainability of an FTA Under a Maximum Revenue Tariff Regime.
- 3.5.4 Comparison Between Two Tariff Schemes3.6 Sustainability of MFT Under a Bilateral FTA; 3.6.1 Sustainability Under a Welfare-Maximizing Tariff Regime; 3.6.2 Sustainability Under a Revenue-Maximizing Tariff Regime; 3.6.3 Does FTA Become a Building Block or a Stumbling Block to MFT?; 3.7 Concluding Remarks; References; 4 Technology Choice, Firm Behavior, and Free Trade Agreements; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Model; 4.3 Preliminary Analysis; 4.3.1 Third-Stage Equilibrium; 4.3.2 Equilibrium Tariff Rate Under Uniform Tariff Policy; 4.3.3 Equilibrium Tariff Rate Under FTA; 4.4 Technology Choice.
- 4.4.1 Uniform Tariff Case4.4.2 FTA Case; 4.4.3 Effects of FTA on Technology Choice; 4.5 Effect of FTA on the Importing Country's Welfare; 4.6 Concluding Remark; References; Part II The Timing of Trade Policies; 5 Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Under the Three-Country Model; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 The Model; 5.3 The Analysis; 5.3.1 Stage 3 Subgame; 5.3.2 Stage 2 Subgame; 5.3.2.1 Simultaneous Move; 5.3.2.2 Sequential Move; 5.3.3 Stage 1 Subgame; 5.4 Main Results; 5.4.1 Comparison Among Subsidy Rates; 5.4.2 Endogenous Timing; 5.5 Free Trade vs. Bilateral Intervention.