Innocence Lost : an Examination of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing.
Our lives are such that moral wrongdoing is sometimes inescapable for us. We have moral responsibilities to persons which may conflict and which it is wrong to violate even when they do conflict. Christopher W. Gowans argues that we must accept this conclusion if we are to make sense of ourmoral exp...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Cary :
Oxford University Press,
1994.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- 1. ""The Angel Must Hang!"": Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing in Melville's Billy Budd; I. The Idea of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing; II. The Controversy about Billy Budd; III. The Trial of Billy Budd; IV. A Tragic Choice; V. An Assessment of Vere; VI. A Prospectus of Philosophical Issues; 2. Methodological Issues: Reflective Intuitionism; I. The Importance of Methodology; II. Hare's Linguistic Method; III. A Reformulation of Rawls: From Reflective Equilibrium to Reflective Intuitionism; IV. A Defense of Reflective Intuitionism; 3. Arguments for the Dilemmas Thesis.
- I. The Dilemmas ThesisII. The Equality Argument; III. The Incomparability Argument; IV. The Phenomenological Argument; V. Sinnott-Armstrong's Understanding of Moral Dilemmas
- 4. A Prescriptivist Argument against the Dilemmas Thesis; I. Prescriptivism and the Dilemmas Thesis; II. Attempts to Reconcile the Dilemmas Thesis and Intention-Prescriptivism; III. Intention-Prescriptivism and a Common Argument against the Dilemmas Thesis; IV. The Kantian Principle; V. The Agglomeration Principle; VI. The Significance of the Argument against the Dilemmas Thesis.
- 5. The Phenomenological Argument for the Remainders ThesisI. The Remainders Thesis; II. The Phenomenological Argument Revisited; III. The Phenomenological Argument and the Method of Reflective Intuitionism; IV. The Status of Intuitions about Inescapable Moral Distress; V. Some Common Explanations of Inescapable Moral Distress; 6. Responsibilities to Persons: An Explanation of Inescapable Moral Distress; I. Normative Issues in the Debate about the Remainders Thesis; II. Responsibilities to Persons; III. More on Responsibilities; IV. Conflicting Responsibilities and Inescapable Moral Distress.
- V. Wrongdoing and ObjectivityVI. Pluralism and Incomparability; 7. Utilitarian Critiques of the Phenomenological Argument; I. Utilitarian and Kantian Explanations of Inescapable Moral Distress; II. The Act-Utilitarian Rejection of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing; III. Mill's Critique of the Phenomenological Argument; IV. Hare's Critique of the Phenomenological Argument; V. The Utilitarian Account of Moral Rules; VI. The Utilitarian Account of Inescapable Moral Distress; 8. Kantian Critiques of the Phenomenological Argument; I. Respect for Persons as Ends in Themselves.
- II. The Impossibility of Conflicting ObligationsIII. The Displacement of Persons; IV. Donagan on Conflicting Grounds of Obligation; V. Herman on Conflicting Grounds of Obligation; VI. Korsgaard on Resisting Evil; 9. Innocence Lost; I. The Ideal of Moral Innocence; II. The Nature of Moral Tragedy; III. The Problem of Dirty Hands; Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; W; Z.