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Dividing Reality.
The central question in this book is why it seems reasonable for the words of our language to divide up the world in ordinary ways rather than other imaginable ways. Hirsch calls this the division problem. His book aims to bring this problem into sharp focus, to distinguish it from variousrelated pr...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cary :
Oxford University Press,
1993.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- 1. The Division Problem; 1. Introduction to the Problem; 2. Classificatory and Individuative Strangeness; a. Individuative Strangeness and Ontological Commitment; b. The Believer and the Disbeliever; c. The Hybrid Meta-Language; d. Individuative Strangeness without Classificatory Strangeness; 3. Strange Languages and Strange Thoughts; a. Strong and Weak Versions of Strangeness; b. Thinking in a Strange Language; c. Synonymy and Strangeness; d. Strange Propositions; e. Strange Primitives; 4. Further Examples of Strangeness; a. Classificatory Examples; b. Individuative Examples.
- 5. The Weight of the Intuitions6. The Distinctness of the Division Problem; 2. Projectibility and Strange Languages; 1. Goodman's Problem and the Division Problem; 2. The Projectibility Principle; a. Projectible Terms; b. The Epistemological Claim; c. The Similarity Principle; d. Another Argument for the Epistemological Claim; e. Transcendental Arguments and the Epistemological Claim; 3. Projectibility and Ostensive Learning; 4. Projectibility, Similarity, and Individuation; a. Strange Similarity Classes; b. Intrinsic Similarity Classes; c. Similarity and Salience; d. Predictable Things.
- 3. Reality's Joints I: Properties1. Reality's Joints and the Division Problem; 2. Natural Properties; 3. The Similarity Analysis; a. The Problem of Imperfect Community; b. Dimensions of Comparison; c. The Property P*; d. Other Consequences of (N); 4. The Causal Analysis; a. The Standard Causal Analysis; b. A Modified Causal Analysis; c. Metaphysical versus Nomic Naturalness; 5. Against Egalitarianism; a. The Counterintuitiveness of Egalitarianism; b. The Empirical Argument; c. The A Priori Argument; 6. Degrees of Naturalness; a. Degrees of Metaphysical Naturalness.
- B. Degrees of Nomic Naturalnessc. The Overall Scale; 7. Explanation and Classification; a. The Explanation Claim; b. Putnam's Constraint; c. Strict Correctness and Pragmatic Adequacy; d. Explanatory Equivalence and the Strange Languages; 4. Reality's Joints II: Things; 1. Natural Things; a. Egalitarian and Inegalitarian Views; b. Analyses of Thing-Naturalness; c. Four Problems for (P); d. How Deep Is Thing-Naturalness?; 2. The Semantic Argument; a. Objections to the Argument; b. Objections to the Revised Argument; c. Normative and Modal Arguments; 3. Inscrutability; a. Pseudo-Languages.
- B. Truth-Conditional and Inscrutability Thesesc. Constraints on Reference Schemes; d. Interpretive Charity; 5. The Pragmatic Response; 1. Extreme Relativism versus Pragmatism; 2. Salience; a. Salience and Ostensive Learning; b. Salience and Perceptual Speed; c. The Salience Principle; 3. Important Properties and Things; a. Importance and Salience; b. Which Properties Are Important?; c. The Attention Claim; d. Attention and Projectibility; e. Important Things; f. Summary of the Argument Thus Far; 4. Economy; a. The Economy Principle; b. Economy and Incompatibility Languages.