Duty to Respond : Mass crime, Denial and Collective Responsibility.

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Dimitrijevic, Nenad
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York : Central European University Press, 2011.
Temas:
Collective behavior > Moral and ethical aspects.
Crimes against humanity > Moral and ethical aspects.
Group identity > Moral and ethical aspects.
Social ethics.
Transitional justice.
Comportement collectif > Aspect moral.
Crimes contre l'humanité > Aspect moral.
Justice transitionnelle.
Identité collective > Aspect moral.
Transitional justice
Social ethics
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Front cover
  • Title page
  • Copyright page
  • Table of Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • Chapter One: Criminal Regime, its Subjects, and Collective Crime
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 The Challenge of the Disturbing Past
  • 3 Regime and its Subjects: Regime Crime and Collective Crime
  • 3.1 REGIME CRIMES
  • 3.2 COLLECTIVE CRIMES
  • 3.2.1 The preparation of collective crime
  • 3.2.2 Criminal action
  • 3.2.3 Approving outcomes of crime
  • Chapter Two: Politics of Silence and Denial
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Transitional Justice or Just the Transition? Politics of Silence2.1 GENERAL ARGUMENT: VULNERABILITY OF DEMOCRACY
  • 2.2 SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS
  • 2.2.1 Political reconciliation in the name of protecting the genuine common identity
  • 2.2.2 Injustice
  • 2.2.3 Unmasterable burden
  • 3 “We did Nothing Wrongâ€?: Politics of Denial
  • 4 A Summary
  • Chapter Three: Culture, Knowledge, and Collective Crime: Reading Relativism
  • 1 Introduction: Crime-specific Culture
  • 2 Moral Relativism as a Philosophical Argument
  • 3 Blaming Culture for Moral Confusion?
  • 3.1 COLLECTIVE CRIME AS A NORMATIVE PRACTICE3.2 INABILITY THESIS
  • 3.2.1 Supporting inability thesis: psychology of obedience to authority
  • 3.2.2 Supporting inability thesis: on the political production of culture
  • 4 The Inability Thesis as the Authenticity Thesis: on “Broken Thermometers, â€? “Genuine Beliefs, â€? and Mass Crimes
  • 4.1 RICHARD ARNESON ON MORAL INEQUALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
  • 4.2 MICHAEL ZIMMERMAN AND THE DEBATE ON “EXCUSING THE INEXCUSABLEâ€?
  • 5 Gilbert Harman on the Non-moral Character of Extreme Intentions
  • Chapter Four: Moral Responsibility for Collective Crime1 Introduction
  • 2 Conceptualizing Moral Responsibility
  • 2.1 A PRELIMINARY DEFINITION
  • 2.2 RESPONSIBILITY AS A RELATIONSHIP
  • 3 Social Groups
  • 3.1 THE CHALLENGE OF METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM
  • 3.2 THE GROUP STRUCTURE
  • 3.3 SOLIDARITY THROUGH TIME
  • 3.4 COLLECTIVE ACTION: RELATIONAL AND POSITIONAL
  • 4 Collective Moral Responsibility
  • 4.1 THE QUESTION
  • 4.2 RESPONSIBLE AGENCY AND THE AUTONOMY OBJECTION. CAN THE IDEA OF EXTENDED PARTICIPATION PROVIDE AN ANSWER?
  • 4.3 TWO CAUSAL REASONS FOR COLLECTIVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY4.3.1 Intention
  • 4.3.2 Participation
  • 4.4 AN IDENTITY-BASED REASON FOR COLLECTIVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
  • 5 Collective Moral Responsibility beyond Causality and Blame
  • 5.1 GROUP-SPECIFIC IDENTITIES CREATED BY CRIME
  • 5.1.1 Victims
  • 5.1.2 On the side of criminals: agents, by standers, decent persons
  • 5.2 HOW IDEOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF COLLECTIVE CRIME AFFECTS MORALLY DECENT PERSONS
  • 5.3 SOLIDARITY, TAINT, AND RESPONSES
  • 5.3.1 Solidarity revisited
  • 5.3.2 Moral taint
  • 5.3.3 Two forms of collective responsibility

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