Anti-cartel enforcement in a contemporary age : leniency religion /

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Leniency policies are seen as a revolution in contemporary anti-cartel law enforcement. Unique to competition law, these policies are regarded as essential to detecting, punishing and deterring business collusion conduct that subverts competition at national and global levels. Featuring contribution...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Beaton-Wells, Caron (Editor ), Tran, Christopher (Editor )
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford ; Portland, OR : Hart Publising, 2015.
Colección:Hart studies in competition law ; v. 10.
Temas:
Antitrust law.
Cartels > State supervision.
Cartels > Contrôle de l'État.
Competition law > Antitrust law.
LAW > Antitrust.
Antitrust law
Cartels > State supervision
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Half-title
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Foreword
  • Contents
  • List of Contributors
  • Part I: Introduction
  • 1. Leniency Policies: Revolution or Religion?
  • I. BACKGROUND
  • II. AIMS OF THIS BOOK
  • III. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
  • IV. REFLECTIONS
  • Part II: Leniency Convergence and Divergence
  • 2. Leadership of Leniency
  • I. INTRODUCTION
  • II. THE HISTORY AND PROLIFERATION OF THE UNITED STATES LENIENCY POLICY
  • III. BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE LENIENCY POLICY
  • IV. TRANSPARENT POLICIES: THE KEY TO CONTINUED LENIENCY SUCCESS
  • V. CONCLUSION
  • 3. Leniency Policy with Chinese CharacteristicsI. INTRODUCTION
  • II. THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR LENIENCY IN CARTEL ENFORCEMENT
  • III. COMPETITION LAW AND LENIENCY COME TO CHINA
  • IV. CHINESE LENIENCY IN PRACTICE
  • V. CONCLUSION
  • Part III: Leniency and the Competition Authority
  • 4. What do we know about the Effectiveness of Leniency Policies? A Survey of the Empirical and Experimental Evidence
  • I. INTRODUCTION
  • II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON LENIENCY POLICIES
  • III. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON LENIENCY POLICIES
  • IV. CONCLUSION
  • 5. Anti-Cartel Enforcement in Japan: Does Leniency Make the Difference?I. INTRODUCTION
  • II. THE JAPANESE LENIENCY PROGRAMME
  • III. A SIMPLE, CLEAR AND TRANSPARENT LENIENCY PROGRAMME
  • IV. THE LENIENCY PROGRAMME: APPLICATIONS AND FINAL DECISIONS
  • V. THE JAPANESE LENIENCY PROGRAMME AND DETECTION
  • VI. THE JAPANESE LENIENCY PROGRAMME AND DETERRENCE
  • VII. THE LENIENCY PROGRAMMEâ€?S CONTRIBUTION TO A DIVERSIFIED ENFORCEMENT POLICY
  • VIII. CONCLUSION
  • 6. Leniency, Profi ling and Reverse Profiling in Multi-Product Markets: Strategic Challenges for Competition AuthoritiesI. INTRODUCTION
  • II. BACKGROUND
  • III. LITERATURE
  • IV. SUMMARY OF THE MODEL
  • V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFILING
  • VI. CONCLUSION
  • APPENDIX A: FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE MODEL
  • APPENDIX B: PROOF
  • 7. A Case for Capping the Dosage: Leniency and Competition Authority Governance
  • I. INTRODUCTION
  • II. THE DOJ LENIENCY REFORMS OF THE 1990S
  • III. LENIENCY SIDE-EFFECTS AND COMPETITION AGENCY GOVERNANCE
  • IV. LENIENCY AS ONE ELEMENT OF A DIVERSIFIED ANTI-CARTEL PROGRAMMEV. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED UNDERSTANDING OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT
  • Part IV: Leniency and the Corporation
  • 8. Leniency Decision-Making from a Corporate Perspective: Complex Realities
  • I. INTRODUCTION
  • II. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF LENIENCY POLICIES
  • III. LENIENCY AS A RATIONAL CHOICE
  • IV. DO LENIENCY POLICIES DESTABILISE AND DETER CARTELS?
  • V. IS THERE REALLY A â€? RACE â€? TO THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY?
  • VI. CONCLUSION

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