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Scepticism and the First Person /
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Routledge,
2015.
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| Colección: | Routledge library editions. Epistemology.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Half Title; Title Page ; Copyright Page; Original Title Page; Original Copyright Page; Dedication ; Table of Contents; INTRODUCTION; ABSTRACT; I. THE A PRIORI DEADLOCK; II. PERSONAL PRONOUNS A; III. PERSONAL PRONOUNS B; IV. PRIVATE LANGUAGE; V. EPISTEMOLOGY A; VI. EPISTEMOLOGY B; VII. SELF-ASCRIPTION AND OTHER ASCRIPTION; SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY; 1 Are pronoun differences or similarities to he dominant?; 2 The argument from necessary plurals which seems to settle the issue; 3 The argument from necessary plurals is indecisive as regards two possibilities.
- 4 An argument against the view that personal demonstratives are extrudable5 Does a personal particular help?; 6 Some arguments for and against personal uniqueness; 7 The present state of the argument; 8 Four things pursued; 9 Special features of the first person; 10 Are the special features of the first person needed for the performance of self-reference?; 11 Are the personal pronouns essential to the formulation of the paradoxes?; 12 The function and importance of the special features of the first person; 13 The systematically elusive 'I'
- 14 Which of the special features of the first person are essential to self-reference?15 Reference and self-reference.; 16 Is our view of the first person relevant to the alleviation of the paradoxes?; 17 Speaker-hearer asymmetry; 18 Symmetrical asymmetry among all three persons; 19 Systematically private language; 20 The necessity of the first person to private language; 21 Arguments not to he used; 22 The relevant nature of first person asymmetry; 23 Self-individuation pre-supposes non-self-individuation; 24 The first person overburdens private language; 25 An undercutting question.
- 26 Speech as action and its implications for the sceptic27 Systematically ulterior motives; 28 The sceptical position denies its own presuppositions; 29 Unhelpful answers to 'How do you know you are X?'; 30 Feeling; 31 Tactual and non-tactual feelings; 32 Non-tactual feelings and the other senses; 33 Corrigihility; 34 Material self-ascription and personal self-ascription; 35 Non-transferability; 36 P-claims, M-claims and sufficiently similar circumstances.