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The appeal to the given : a study in epistemology /
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
London, England ; New York, New York :
Routledge,
1970.
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| Colección: | Routledge library editions. Epistemology.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Half Title; Title; Copyright; Original Title; Original Copyright; PREFACE; Contents; 1: THE GIVEN IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY; I Introductory Remarks; II C.I. Lewis on the Given; III The Appeal to the Given; IV The New Defence; V Reopening the Question; 2: THE NAIVE VIEW; I Three Views regarding the Given; II The IET and its Opposition to the other Theories; III The Claim that there is no Given; IV Views of the Given and Theories of Perception; V The Naive View of the Dispute; 3: THE GIVEN AS SENSE-DATA; I Implications of the Naive View; II The Non-Empirical Nature of the Sense-Datum.
- III Pointing out Sense-DataIV The Sense-Datum as a Theoretical Entity; V The Linguistic Theory; VI Concluding Note on Fact, Theory and Language; 4: THE GIVEN AS OBJECTS; I Objects and Physical Objects; II The Argument from Illusion; III Common-Sense and Direct Realism; IV The Gap between Sensation and Perceptual Awareness; V Intuition versus Thought; VI Armstrong's Theory; VII Intuition and Direct Experience; VIII The Percept Theory; IX The Judgment Theory; X Is there really a Gap?; XI The Non-Empirical Nature of Objects; 5: THE GIVEN AS IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE; I The Presentational Continuum.
- II Bradley on Immediate ExperienceIII Some Findings of the Psychologist; IV Immediate Experience and the Sensual Continuum; 6: PROBLEM OR PSEUDO-PROBLEM; I Different Concepts of Direct Perception; II Ostensible Physical Objects as the Given; III Different Meanings; IV Cross-Purposes; V The Non-Inferentially Present; VI That there is a Problem; 7: MAKING OR FINDING THE FACTS; I The Nature of Thought: Correspondence and Coherence; II The Given Facts; III Does Knowing make a Difference to What is Known?; IV Finding or Making; V Ayer's View; 8: THOUGHT AND COGNITION.
- I Different Views of CognitionII The Interpreter View; III The Constructor View; IV The Spectator View; V Concepts of the Mind; VI The Relation of these to the Appeal to the Given; 9: THE REAL ISSUE; I Three hints; II Ryle's Suggestion; III Another Suggestion; IV The Clue from Bradley; V The Quest for Certainty; VI Discrediting the Common-Sense World; VII The Role of Thought; 10: EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF PERCEPTION; I Three Approaches to the Philosophy of Perception; II Neurology and Perception; III The Double-Aspect Theory; IV Psychology and Perception.
- V The Complementarity ThesisVI Conclusion; 11: EPISTEMOLOGY, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHYSICS; I Epistomelogy as Analysis; II Ayer's View; III Chisholm's View; IV The Epistemologically Basic; V An Analytic Science?; VI Concluding Remarks; 12: COMMOM SENSE AND RIVAL ONTOLOGIES; I Alternative Ontologies; II Strawson's View; III Sellars' View; IV The Complementarity Thesis once more; V World-Views and Models; VI Localization of the Argument; VII Some Reservations; VIII Concluding Remarks; INDEX.