Collective choice and social welfare. Volume 11 /

This book is concerned with the study of collective preference, in particular with the relationship between the objectives of social action and the preferences and aspirations of society's members. Professor Sen's approach is based on the assumption that the problem of collective choice ca...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Sen, A. K.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1995.
Colección:Advanced textbooks in economics.
Temas:
Welfare economics.
Social choice.
Économie du bien-être.
Choix collectif.
Social choice
Welfare economics
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Collective choice and social welfare.  |n Volume 11 /  |c A.K. Sen. 
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490 1 |a Advanced textbooks in economics ;  |v v. 11 
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505 0 |a Front Cover; Collective Choice and social Welfare; Copyright Page; Introduction to The Series; Dedication; Table of Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION; 1.1. Preliminary Remarks; 1.2. Ingredients of Collective Choice; 1.3. The Nature of Individual Preferences; Chapter 1*. PREFERENCE RELATIONS; 1*1. Binary Relations; 1*2 Maximal Elements and Choice Sets; 1*3. A Set of Results for Quasi-Orderings; 1*4. Subrelations and Compatibility; 1*5. Choice Functions and Quasi-Transiiivity; 1*6. Preference and Rational Choice; Chapter 2. UNANIMITY; 2.1. The Pareto Criterion. 
505 8 |a 2.2. Pareto-Inclusive Choice Rules2.3. Consensus as a Basis of Collective Action; Chapter 2*. COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES ANDPARETO COMPARISONS; 2*1. Choice and Pareto Relation; 2*2. Compensation Tests; Chapter 3. COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY; 3.1. The Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function; 3.2. Arrowian Social Welfare Function; 3.3. The General Possibility Theorem; 3.4. A Comment on the Significance of Arrow's Results; Chapter 3*. SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS; 3*1. The Impossibility Theorem; Chapter 4. CHOICE VERSUS ORDERINGS; 4.1. Transitivity, Quasi-Transitivity, and Acyclicity. 
505 8 |a 4.2. Collective Choice and Arrow's Conditions4.3. Rationality and Collective Choice; Chapter 4*. SOCIAL DECISION FUNCTIONS; 4*1. Possibility Theorems; Chapter 5. VALUES AND CHOICE; 5.1. Welfare Economics and Value Judgments; 5.2. Content of Welfare Economics: A Dilemma; 5.3. Basic and Nonbasic Judgments; 5.4. Facts and Values; 5.5. Individual Orderings and Choice Rules; 5.6. Conditions on Choice Rules; Chapter 5*. ANONYMITY, NEUTRALITY AND RESPONSIVENESS; 5*1. Conditions for Majority Rule; 5*2. Pareto-Extension Rules; Chapter 6. CONFLICTS AND DILEMMAS. 
505 8 |a 6.1. Critique of Anonymity and Neutrality6.2. Liberal Values and an Impossibility Result; 6.3. Critique of Acyclicity; 6.4. Critique of Liberal Values; 6.5. Critique of the Pareto Principle; 6.6. Critique of Unrestricted Domain; Chapter 6*. THE LIBERAL PARADOX; 6*1. Liberalism versus the Pareto Principle; 6*2. Extensions; Chapter 7. INTERPERSONAL AGGREGATION AND COMPARABILITY; 7.1. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; 7.2. Comparability, Cardinality and Discrimination; 7.3. Uses of von Neumann-Morgenstern Cardinalization; 7.4. Partial Comparability; 7.5. Adding Ordinal-Type Welfare. 
505 8 |a Chapter 7*. AGGREGATION QUASI-ORDERINGS17*1. Comparability and Aggregation; 7*2. Partial Comparability; 7*3. Regularity and Symmetry; 7*4. Addition of Noncardinal Welfare; Chapter 8. CARDINALITY WITH OR WITHOUT COMPARABILITY; 8.1. Bargaining Advantages and Collective Choice; 8.2. Cardinality and Impossibility; Chapter 8*. BARGAINS AND SOCIAL WELFAREFUNCTIONALS; 8*1. The Bargaining Problem of Nash; 8*2. Social Welfare Functional; Chapter 9. EQUITY AND JUSTICE; 9.1. Universalization and Equity; 9.2. Fairness and Maximin Justice; 9.3. Impersonality and Expected Utility Maximization. 
520 |a This book is concerned with the study of collective preference, in particular with the relationship between the objectives of social action and the preferences and aspirations of society's members. Professor Sen's approach is based on the assumption that the problem of collective choice cannot be satisfactorily discussed within the confines of economics. While collective choice forms a crucial aspect of economics, the subject pertains also to political science, the theory of the state, and to the theory of decision procedures. The author has therefore used material from these disciplines, plus. 
590 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b Ebook Central Academic Complete 
650 0 |a Welfare economics. 
650 0 |a Social choice. 
650 6 |a Économie du bien-être. 
650 6 |a Choix collectif. 
650 7 |a Social choice  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Welfare economics  |2 fast 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Sen, A.K.  |t Collective Choice and Social Welfare : Volume 11.  |d Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1995  |z 9780444851277 
830 0 |a Advanced textbooks in economics. 
856 4 0 |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1877078  |z Texto completo 
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