Freedom, fatalism, and foreknowledge /
We typically think we have free will. But how could we have free will, if for anything we do, it was already true in the distant past that we would do that thing? Or how could we have free will, if God already knows in advance all the details of our lives? Such issues raise the specter of "&quo...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Otros Autores: | , |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
New York, NY, United States of America :
Oxford University Press,
[2015]
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover
- Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge
- Copyright
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part I The Arguments for Fatalism
- 1. Fate
- 2. Fatalism
- 3. Truth and Freedom
- 4. The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks
- 5. Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise
- 6. Presentism and Fatalism
- 7. Compatibilist Options
- Part II The Problem of Foreknowledge
- 8. Omniscience and the Arrow of Time
- 9. Troubles with Ockhamism
- 10. Presentism and Ockham's Way Out
- 11. Geachianism
- 12. On Augustine's Way Out
- Part III The Logic of Future Contingents
- 13. The Meaning of "Is Going to Be"
- 14. It Was to Be
- 15. Future Contingents and Relative Truth
- 16. In Defense of Ockhamism
- Bibliography (compiled by Patrick Todd)
- Index.