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Failure to prevent gross human rights violations in Darfur : warnings to and responses by international decision makers (2003-2005) /
The book looks at the role of states and international organisations in their attempts to prevent the genocide in Darfur (2003-2005); from early warning to limited action in the field of humanitarian assistance, mediation, sanctions and peace-keeping. The book uses several theories to explain how de...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Leiden :
BRILL,
2014.
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| Colección: | International criminal law series.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Failure to Prevent Gross Human Rights Violations in Darfur; Copyright; Contents; Preface; List of Abbreviations; Biographic Note; 1. Introducing the Research: Questions and Methodology; 1.1 Introduction to the Research; 1.2 Research Questions; 1.3 Methodology; 1.4 The Theoretical Context; 1.5 Defining Early Warning and Early Action; 1.5.1 Operationalising Early Warning and Early Action; 1.5.2 Selected Period for Warnings and Actions; 1.6 Data Gathering and Sources Used; 1.6.1 Information ex tempore and ex post; 1.6.2 Leaked US Diplomatic Cables; 1.7 Visualising the Conflict; 1.7.1 Visualising the Casualties1.7.2 Visualising Early Warning and Early Action; 1.8 Structure of the Book.
- 2. Theories in International Relations; 2.1 Realism and Pluralism; 2.2 Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy; 2.3 Decision-Making Theories; 2.3.1 Rational Policy Model; 2.3.2 Organisational Process Model; 2.3.3 Bureaucratic Politics Model; 2.4 Cognitive Dissonance and other Psychological Mechanisms; 3. Case Studies: Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995); 3.1 Warnings and Knowledge; 3.1.1 Rwanda; 3.1.2 Srebrenica; 3.2 Responses; 3.2.1 Rwanda; 3.2.2 Srebrenica; 3.3 Explaining the Warning-Response Gap for Rwanda and Srebrenica3.3.1 Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy; 3.3.2 Rational Policy Model; 3.3.3 Organisational Process Model; 3.3.4 Bureaucratic Politics Model; 3.3.5 Cognitive Dissonance and other Psychological Mechanisms.
- 4. A Background of Darfur; 4.1 Composition of Sudan and the Inhabitants of Darfur; 4.2 A Long History; 4.3 Low Level Conflict in Darfur and the Rise of Rebel Groups; 4.4 North-South Conflict and Peace Process; 4.5 Root Causes; 5. Warnings: February 2003-February 2004; 5.1 Situation in Darfur: The Start of the Rebellion; 5.2 Warnings and Knowledge5.2.1 Early Warnings; 5.2.2 Knowledge and Awareness about Darfur; 5.3 Reflection: Who Knew What at What Moment?; 5.4 Response; 5.5 Explaining the Warning
- Response Gap; 5.5.1 Wishful Thinking and Cognitive Dissonance with Respect to the North-South Negotiations; 5.5.2 Disbelief; 5.5.3 Conflict Framed and Represented as a Humanitarian Crisis or Civil War; 5.5.4 Why was the UN Secretariat so Cautious?
- 6. First Actions and Increased Public Outcry: March 2004-May 2004; 6.1 Situation in Darfur; 6.2 The 8 April N'Djamena Ceasefire; 6.2.1 Start of the AU Observer Mission AMIS6.3 Increased Public Outcry; 6.3.1 Kapila's "Whistleblowing" and SG Annan's Response; 6.3.2 Increased Media Attention; 6.3.3 European Parliament Resolution of 31 March 2004; 6.4 UN Commission on Human Rights; 6.5 Route to the Security Council; 6.6 First Security Council Action; 6.6.1 Security Council Statement of 25 May; 6.6.2 UN without Leadership in Sudan; 6.7 Start of the Deployment of AMIS; 6.8 Theoretical Reflections: Bureaucratic Politics within the UN; 7. Increased International Activity and Decision-making: June 2004-September 2004; 7.1 Situation in Darfur.