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Cooperative Extensions of the Bayesian Game.

This is the very first comprehensive monograph in a burgeoning, new research area - the theory of cooperative game with incomplete information with emphasis on the solution concept of Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium that encompasses the concept of the Bayesian incentive compatible c...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Ichiishi, Tatsuro
Otros Autores: Yamazaki, Akira
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Singapore : World Scientific Publishing Company, 2006.
Colección:Series on Mathematical Economics & Game Theory.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • I BASIC INGREDIENTS
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Cooperative Extension of the Bayesian Game
  • 2.1 Formal Model
  • 2.2 Examples
  • 2.3 Two Approaches to Formulate Incomplete Information
  • 3 Measurability as Feasibility of Individual Actions
  • 3.1 General Case 3.2 Private Information Case Fully Pooled Information Case
  • 4 Bayesian Incentive Compatibility as Feasibility of Execution of Contracts
  • 4.1 Private Information Case
  • 4.2 Mediator-Based Approach
  • 4.3 Communication Plan as a Part of a Strategy
  • II SOLUTIONS INFORMATION REVELATION 5 Descriptive Solution Concepts
  • 5.1 Interim Solution Concepts
  • 5.2 Ex Ante Solution Concepts
  • 5.3 Other Interactive Modes
  • 5.4 Coexistence of Coalitions
  • 6 Normative Solution Concepts
  • 6.1 Interim Efficiency Concepts
  • 6.2 Coexistence of Coalitions 7 Comparisons of Several Core Concepts
  • 7.1 Fine Core and Ex Post Core
  • 7.2 Private Measurability and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
  • 8 Existence
  • 8.1 Interim Solutions
  • 8.2 Ex Ante Solutions
  • 8.A Appendix to Chapter 8
  • 9 Approaches to Information Revelation 9.1 By Contract Execution
  • 9.2 By Contract Execution: A Profit-Center Game with Incomplete Information
  • 9.3 By Choosing a Contract
  • 9.4 Update of Interim Probabilities