Learning to forget : US Army counterinsurgency doctrine and practice from Vietnam to Iraq /

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This book is a study of how the lessons of the Vietnam War influenced Army attitudes towards counterinsurgency in the post-Vietnam era, with a particular focus on the interplay between military doctrine and history. It demonstrates that Vietnam had a profound effect on Army attitudes towards counter...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Fitzgerald, David, 1984- (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Stanford, California : Stanford Security Studies, 2013.
Temas:
United States. > Army > History.
États-Unis. > Army > Histoire.
United States. > Army
1961-2011
Counterinsurgency > United States > History.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 > United States.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 > Influence.
Iraq War, 2003-2011.
Contre-rébellion > États-Unis > Histoire.
Guerre du Viêt-nam, 1961-1975 > Influence.
Guerre en Irak, 2003-2011.
Counterinsurgency
Influence (Literary, artistic, etc.)
Iraq
United States
History
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Introduction: Counterinsurgency and the Uses of History; Chapter 1: The Army's Counterinsurgency War in Vietnam; Chapter 2: "Out of the Rice Paddies "
  • The 1970s and the Decline of Counterinsurgency; Chapter 3: Low-Intensity Conflict in the Reagan Years; Chapter 4: Peacekeeping and Operations Other Than War In The 1990S; Chapter 5: Mr. Rumsfeld's War: Transformation, Doctrine, and "Phase IV" Planning for Iraq; Chapter 6: Counterinsurgency and "Vietnam" in Iraq, 2003-2006; Chapter 7: The Return of Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24 and the "Surge."
  • Chapter 8: A Never-Ending War?
  • The Renegotiation of "Vietnam" in AfghanistanConclusion; Reference Matter; Notes; Index.

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