Cargando…
Institutional Inertia.
We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
|
| Colección: | IMF Working Papers.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000Mu 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | EBOOKCENTRAL_ocn870245371 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20240329122006.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr |n||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 140208s2009 dcu o 000 0 eng d | ||
| 040 | |a EBLCP |b eng |e pn |c EBLCP |d OCLCQ |d YDXCP |d OCLCQ |d ZCU |d MERUC |d ICG |d OCLCO |d OCLCF |d OCLCQ |d AU@ |d OCLCQ |d DKC |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO |d OCLCL | ||
| 019 | |a 1058772403 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781452721811 | ||
| 020 | |a 1452721815 | ||
| 029 | 1 | |a DEBBG |b BV044178617 | |
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)870245371 |z (OCoLC)1058772403 | ||
| 050 | 4 | |a HD45 .V35 2009 | |
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 658.4 |a 658.4063 |
| 049 | |a UAMI | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Valderrama, Laura. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Institutional Inertia. |
| 260 | |a Washington : |b International Monetary Fund, |c 2009. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (56 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a IMF Working Papers ; |v v. Working Paper No. 09/193 | |
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. A Tale of Explorers, Gold, and Diamonds; III. The Model; A. The Cooperative; 1. Redistribution (date 2 vote); 2. Technology choice (date 1 vote); 3. Example: Voting for an inefficient polarized technology; B. Outside Ownership; C. Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership; IV. Institutional Inertia; V. Discussion; A. Supporting Evidence; B. Implications for Institutional Design; VI. Concluding Remarks; References; Footnotes. | |
| 520 | |a We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic technological bias that is contingent on firm ownership. We provide conditions under which the pivotal voter's political leverage leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce e. | ||
| 590 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b Ebook Central Academic Complete | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Technological innovations. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Industrial management. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Innovations. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Gestion d'entreprise. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Industrial management |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Technological innovations |2 fast | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Institutional Inertia (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGG8khjPbFpX7pcV7xgWj3 |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Valderrama, Laura. |t Institutional Inertia. |d Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2009 |z 9781451873405 |
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF Working Papers. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1608810 |z Texto completo |
| 938 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b EBLB |n EBL1608810 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 11618145 | ||
| 994 | |a 92 |b IZTAP | ||