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Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk.
We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-rank...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
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| Colección: | IMF Working Papers.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
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| 020 | |a 9781451916829 | ||
| 020 | |a 1451916825 | ||
| 029 | 1 | |a DEBBG |b BV044178525 | |
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)870245347 | ||
| 050 | 4 | |a HG3891.5 |b .N53 2009 | |
| 049 | |a UAMI | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a De Nicoló, Gianni. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk. |
| 260 | |a Washington : |b International Monetary Fund, |c 2009. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (31 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a IMF Working Papers | |
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; A. Time, Endowments and Preferences; B. Technologies; C. Contracts and Information; III. Equilibrium with Banks and Depositors; A. Moral Hazard; B. No Moral Hazard; IV. Optimality and Intermediary Rents; V. Equilibrium with Firms, Intermediaries and Depositors; A. The Extended Model; B. Perfectly Correlated Projects; C. Independent Projects; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References. | |
| 520 | |a We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically rele. | ||
| 590 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b Ebook Central Academic Complete | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Intermediation (Finance) | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Competition. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Intermédiation financière. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Competition |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Intermediation (Finance) |2 fast | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Lucchetta, Marcella. | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a De Nicoló, Gianni. |t Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk: A General Equilibrium Exposition. |d Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2009 |z 9781451872521 |
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF Working Papers. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1608284 |z Texto completo |
| 938 | |a EBL - Ebook Library |b EBLB |n EBL1608284 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 11617898 | ||
| 994 | |a 92 |b IZTAP | ||