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Hold Your Nose and Vote.
This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of res...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
|
| Colección: | IMF Working Papers.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
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| 049 | |a UAMI | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Pani, Marco. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Hold Your Nose and Vote. |
| 260 | |a Washington : |b International Monetary Fund, |c 2009. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (34 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a IMF Working Papers | |
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References. | |
| 520 | |a This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, so. | ||
| 590 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b Ebook Central Academic Complete | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Political corruption. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Democracy. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Corruption (Politique) | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Democracy |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Political corruption |2 fast | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Hold your nose and vote (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCYMBYKRXw8QgrTpX3Pxpk8 |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Pani, Marco. |t Hold Your Nose and Vote: Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? |d Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2009 |z 9781451872309 |
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF Working Papers. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1608208 |z Texto completo |
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