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Political Risk Aversion.
This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
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| Colección: | IMF Working Papers.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Basic Model; A. Economic Environment; B. Technology Choice; C. Aggregate Uncertainty; III. Institutional Reform; A. Outside Ownership; B. Endogenizing Ownership; C. Dominated Employee Ownership; IV. Efficieny, Innovation, and Labor Mobility; A. Partnership Efficiency; 1. Technological and Institutional Efficiency; B. Institutional Efficiency; 2. Endogeneous ownership; V. Discussion; A. How does the model fit the facts?; B. Foundations of Individual Uncertainty; C. Heterogeneous Investors; VI. Related Literature.
- VII. Concluding RemarksReferences; Footnotes.