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Political Risk Aversion.
This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
|
| Colección: | IMF Working Papers.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Valderrama, Laura. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Political Risk Aversion. |
| 260 | |a Washington : |b International Monetary Fund, |c 2009. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (56 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a IMF Working Papers ; |v v. Working Paper No. 09/194 | |
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Basic Model; A. Economic Environment; B. Technology Choice; C. Aggregate Uncertainty; III. Institutional Reform; A. Outside Ownership; B. Endogenizing Ownership; C. Dominated Employee Ownership; IV. Efficieny, Innovation, and Labor Mobility; A. Partnership Efficiency; 1. Technological and Institutional Efficiency; B. Institutional Efficiency; 2. Endogeneous ownership; V. Discussion; A. How does the model fit the facts?; B. Foundations of Individual Uncertainty; C. Heterogeneous Investors; VI. Related Literature. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a VII. Concluding RemarksReferences; Footnotes. | |
| 520 | |a This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in the aversion to the potential loss of political clout in future voting decisions. Thus, risk neutral individuals exhibit what we call political risk aversion. Yet individual uncertainty is not all bad news as it may open the door to institutional reform. We endogenize institutional reform and show. | ||
| 590 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b Ebook Central Academic Complete | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Uncertainty. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Rational expectations (Economic theory) | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Incertitude. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Rational expectations (Economic theory) |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Uncertainty |2 fast | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Political risk aversion (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGHPBtJDtCHvVCBCV7pFJC |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Valderrama, Laura. |t Political Risk Aversion. |d Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2009 |z 9781451873412 |
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF Working Papers. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1608817 |z Texto completo |
| 938 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b EBLB |n EBL1608817 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 11618122 | ||
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