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Macro-Financial Linkages.
Macrofinancial linkages have long been at the core of the IMF's mandate to oversee the stability of the global financial system. With the advent of the economic crisis, the Fund has drawn on this research in order to contribute to critical debates on the nature of appropriate policy responses a...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | , , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington :
International Monetary Fund,
2010.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Contents; Foreword; Acknowledgments; Contributors; Introduction; I. FINANCIAL BOOM-BUST CYCLES; Chapter 1 Lending Booms and Lending Standards; 1.1. Introduction; 1.2. Model; 1.3. Equilibrium; 1.4. Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Crises; 1.5. Determinants of Equilibrium; 1.6. The Role of Information Sharing; 1.7. Conclusion; Appendix I. Proofs; Appendix II. An Alternative Model of Information Acquisition; References; Chapter 2 Are Weak Banks Leading Credit Booms? Evidence from Emerging Europe; 2.1. Introduction; 2.2. Modeling How Bank Soundness Affects Credit Growth; Tables.
- Table 2.1 Sample CoverageTable 2.2 Summary Statistics by Period and Region; 2.3. Are Weak Banks Driving Credit Expansions?; Table 2.3 Simultaneous Modeling of Bank Credit Growth and Distance to Default; Table 2.4 Credit Growth in the Weakest Banks; Table 2.5 Differences in Bank Credit Growth in the Baltics and Other CEECs; 2.4. Conclusion; Table 2.6 Differences in Credit Growth in Banks with High Exposures to Foreign-Currency Lending and Household Lending; Appendix I. Data Sources and Methodology; Table 2.7 Summary Statistics; Table 2.8 Summary Statistics by Country.
- Table 2.9 Variable DescriptionReferences; Chapter 3 Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery; 3.1. Introduction; FIGURES; Figure 3.1 (A) Asian crisis. (B) Debt crisis; Figure 3.2 Protracted civil wars; 3.2. Methodology; 3.3. Data; 3.4. Results; Figure 3.3 Impulse responses: Currency crises; Figure 3.4 Impulse responses: Banking crises; Figure 3.5 Impulse responses: Twin financial crises (currency and banking); Figure 3.6 Impulse responses: Civil wars; Figure 3.7 Impulse responses: Stronger executive power.
- Figure 3.8 Impulse responses: Twin political crises (war and stronger executive power)Table 3.1 Probability of Shocks; Figure 3.9 Impulse responses: Financial crises using Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) dates; Figure 3.10 Impulse responses: Penn World Tables dataset; Figure 3.11 Controlling for oil price changes; 3.5. Exogeneity; Figure 3.12 Impulse responses: Controlling for common period shocks; Figure 3.13 Forecast errors; Table 3.2 Consensus Forecast Errors for Growth; Figure 3.14 Impulse responses: Lagged response of output to crises.
- Table 3.3 Probit Results for Financial and Political Crises3.6. Conclusion; References; Chapter 4 From Subprime Loans to Subprime Growth? Evidence for the Euro Area; 4.1. Introduction; Figure 4.1 Euro area: Money market and retail lending rates; Figure 4.2 Euro area: Changes in credit standards to enterprises and households, 2005-08; Figure 4.3 Euro area: Corporate and equity market prices, 2007-08; Figure 4.4 Euro area: Growth in bank loans and securities issuance, 2003-08; 4.2. Empirical Evidence; Table 4.1 Demand and Supply in the Disequilibrium Model, 1997-2007.