Learning and Coordination : Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium and Convention.

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Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Vanderschraaf, Peter
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Hoboken : Taylor and Francis, 2014.
Colección:Studies in ethics.
Temas:
Social interaction > Mathematical models.
Socialization > Mathematical models.
Game theory.
Game Theory
Interaction sociale > Modèles mathématiques.
Socialisation > Modèles mathématiques.
Théorie des jeux.
PSYCHOLOGY > Social Psychology.
Game theory
Social interaction > Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Acknowledgments; Table of Contents; 1 Social Interaction and Principles of Rational Decision; 1.0 Introduction; 1.1 Examples of Social Coordination Problems; 1.2 Noncooperative Games; 1.3 Nash Equilibrium; 1.4 Examples Revisited; 1.5 Equilibrium-in-Beliefs; 1.6 Conclusion; 2 Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibrium Concepts; 2.0 Introduction; 2.1 Rationalizability; 2.2 Correlated Equilibrium Concepts; 2.3 Correlated Equilibrium, Rationalizability, and Ratifiability; 3 Equilibrium Selection via Inductive Dynamic Deliberation.
  • 3.0 Introduction3.l The Dirichlet Rule; 3.2 Inductive Deliberation with Endogenous Correlation; 3.3 Correlating with States of the World
  • 3.4 Dirichlet Dynamics with Imperfect Memory; 3.5 Random Sampling Dirichlet Deliberation; 3.6 Deliberators with Variable States; 4 The Emergence of Social Convention; 4.0 Introduction; 4.1 Lewis' Characterization of Conventions; 4.2 Convention as Correlated Equilibrium; 4.3 Dynamical Explanations of Conventions; References; Index.

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