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Partisan investment in the global economy : why the left loves foreign direct investment and FDI loves the left /
"Develops a partisan theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) to explain variance in the regulation of foreign investment and in the amount of FDI inflows that countries receive"--
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2013.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- List of Figures; List of Tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Domestic Coalitions and the Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment; 1.1 Globalization of Production and Politics; 1.2 Domestic Coalitions and the Political Economy of FDI; 1.3 Political Alignment and Foreign Investment; 1.4 Trends in FDI; 1.5 FDI in the Literature; 1.5.1 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment; 1.5.2 Political Explanations of FDI; 1.6 A Partisan Theory of FDI; 1.6.1 Preferences; 1.6.2 Organization and Influence; 1.6.3 Domestic Politics and FDI Performance.
- 1.6.4 FDI Performance As a Bargain BetweenInvestors and Governments1.6.5 Exchanging Hostages to Support Economic Exchanges; 1.6.6 Pro-Labor and the Left; 1.6.7 Opportunism and Time-Inconsistency; 1.7 Conclusion; 1.7.1 Layout of the Book; 2 A Political Economy Model of Foreign Direct Investment; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Politics of Investment; 2.3 Distributive Concerns, Partisanship, and Regulation; 2.3.1 Autonomous Government and FDI; 2.3.2 Foreign Investment and Distributive Concerns; 2.3.3 Intuition and Discussion; 2.4 Conclusion; Appendix 2.1; Partisan Government, Taxes, and Investment.
- 3 Tying Hands or Exchanging Hostages3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Investment Risk, Politics, and Commitment; 3.3 Partisanship As a Commitment Mechanism; 3.3.1 Partisan Investment in a Dynamic Setting; 3.4 Political Influence On and Off the Equilibrium Path; 3.4.1 Labor, Business, and Investment Regimes; 3.4.2 Investment and Taxation Off the Equilibrium Path; 3.5 Testable Implications; 3.6 Conclusion; 4 Partisan Governments and Foreign Direct Investment; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Partisanship and FDI Regulation; 4.2.1 Estimating a Measure of Investment Restrictions: Methodology; 4.2.2 Empirical Strategy.
- 4.2.3 Analyses4.3 Partisanship and Investment Flows; 4.3.1 Determinants of Foreign Investment; 4.3.2 Methodology; 4.3.3 Dependent Variable; 4.3.4 Explanatory Variables; 4.3.5 Controls; 4.3.6 Effect of Partisanship on FDI Openness; 4.3.7 Time-Series Cross-Section Data from OECD Countries; 4.3.8 OECD Panel Results; 4.3.9 Gravity Model: Developing and Emerging Countries (1980
- 2000); 4.4 Conclusion; Appendix 4.1: Data Sources and Description; Dependent Variables; Explanatory Variables; Controls; Sample for Investment Policy Orientation Index; Samples for GMM Models (1972
- 2002).
- TSCS Model: Time-Series Cross-Section Panel of FourteenOECD CountriesGravity Model Sample; 5 Labor and Business Influence, Investment Regimes, and Foreign Investment; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Background; 5.3 Labor Influence and Investment Regimes; 5.3.1 FDI Performance Under Alternating Coalitions; 5.3.2 Regression Analysis; 5.4 Labor Influence in Argentina; 5.4.1 Labor Organization and Influence; 5.4.2 Labor Influence and Foreign Direct Investment; 5.4.3 The Advent of Peronism and Organized Labor; 5.4.4 Foreign Investment Regimes in Argentina; 5.5 Conclusion; Appendix 5.1; Data Sources.