A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality /
We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the retu...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
---|---|
Autor principal: | Zettelmeyer, Jeromin |
Autor Corporativo: | International Monetary Fund |
Otros Autores: | Jeanne, Olivier, Ostry, Jonathan David |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2008.
|
Colección: | IMF Working Papers ;
Working Paper no. 08/236. |
Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Ejemplares similares
-
Sovereign insurance and program design : what is optimal for the sovereign? /
por: Messmacher, Miguel
Publicado: (2006) -
Currency mismatches and corporate default risk : modeling, measurement, and surveillance applications /
por: Chan-Lau, Jorge A., et al.
Publicado: (2006) -
Intertwined sovereign and bank solvencies in a model of self-fulfilling crisis /
por: Adler, Gustavo, 1974-
Publicado: (2012) -
Determinants of foreign currency borrowing in the new member states of the EU /
por: Rosenberg, Christoph B., et al.
Publicado: (2008) -
IMF-supported programs and crisis prevention : an analytical framework /
por: Kim, Jun (Jun Il)
Publicado: (2006)