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A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality /

We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the retu...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Zettelmeyer, Jeromin
Autor Corporativo: International Monetary Fund
Otros Autores: Jeanne, Olivier, Ostry, Jonathan David
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008.
Colección:IMF Working Papers ; Working Paper no. 08/236.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Zettelmeyer, Jeromin. 
245 1 2 |a A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality /  |c Zettelmeyer, Jeromin. 
260 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2008. 
300 |a 1 online resource (33 pages). 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
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490 1 |a IMF Working Papers,  |x 2227-8885 ;  |v Working Paper No. 08/236 
500 |a Available in PDF, ePUB, and Mobi formats on the Internet. 
520 3 |a We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-""ex ante"" conditionality. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
590 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b Ebook Central Academic Complete 
610 2 0 |a International Monetary Fund  |x Finance. 
610 2 7 |a International Monetary Fund  |2 fast 
650 0 |a Financial crises  |x Prevention  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Loans, Foreign  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Moral hazard  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Prêts étrangers  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Risque moral  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Finance  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Loans, Foreign  |x Econometric models  |2 fast 
700 1 |a Jeanne, Olivier. 
700 1 |a Ostry, Jonathan David. 
700 1 |a Zettelmeyer, Jeromin. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund. 
730 0 |a IMF eLibrary. 
758 |i has work:  |a A theory of international crisis lending and IMF conditionality (Text)  |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGdtwcFgh4hFhY8tmB476q  |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers ;  |v Working Paper no. 08/236. 
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