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Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies : Facts, Context and Post-Crisis Reforms.
Is European Corporate Governance really dysfunctional? An analysis of European reform proposals based on new, comparative evidence.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2013.
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| Colección: | International corporate law and financial market regulation.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Foreword; Contents; Figures; Tables; Contributors; 1 Corporate boards, incentive pay and shareholder activism in Europe: main issues and policy perspectives; 1. Introduction; 1.1. Purpose and scope; 1.2. EU reform; 1.2.1. After Enron; 1.2.2. The recent financial crisis; 1.3. Varieties of corporate governance; 1.3.1. Shareholder v. stakeholder governance; 1.3.2. Bank governance; 2. Controlling agency costs; 2.1. Market solutions; 2.2. Corporate law; 2.3. 'Comply or explain'; 2.4. Bank prudential regulation; 3. Ownership; 3.1. Dispersed v. concentrated ownership.
- 3.2. The case of family firms4. Boards; 4.1. Theory; 4.2. Practice; 4.3. Empirical analysis; 4.4. Limits of a quantitative approach; 5. Incentive pay; 5.1. Two views; 5.2. Non-financial firms; 5.3. Financial institutions (banks in particular); 5.4. Empirical analysis; 6. Shareholder activism; 6.1. Types and role of activism; 6.2. Regulatory impact and reform proposals; 6.2.1. Shareholder rights; 6.2.2. Shareholder powers; 6.2.3. Reform proposals; 6.3. Empirical analysis; 6.3.1. Management and shareholder proposals; 6.3.2. The Italian slate voting system; 7. Policy; 7.1. Board structures.
- 7.2. Directors' remuneration7.3. Shareholder activism; 7.4. 'Comply or explain'; 7.5. The Action Plan; 8. Concluding remarks; References; 2 European corporate governance codes and their effectiveness; 1. Implementation and enforcement of corporate governance codes; 2. Relationship of the corporate governance codes with the legal environment; 3. Implementation of corporate governance codes; 4. Measuring implementation of corporate governance codes; 5. Drivers for implementation; 6. The scope; 7. Comparative country analysis; 7.1. Austria; 7.2. Belgium; 7.3. Denmark; 7.4. France; 7.5. Germany.
- 7.6. Italy7.7. Luxembourg; 7.8. The Netherlands; 7.8.1 The corporate governance code; 7.8.2 Other corporate governance recommendations; 7.8.3. Dutch case law; 7.9. Portugal; 7.10. Spain; 7.11. Sweden; 7.12. Switzerland; 7.13. UK; 8. Preliminary findings; 8.1. The public or private character of the codes; 8.2. The double-layered system; 8.3. Comply or explain; 8.4. How to measure effectiveness; 8.5. The codes versus hard law; 8.6. Drafting the codes; 8.7. Observing the adoption and the application of the code; 8.8. Disclosing names.
- 8.9. The general role of the shareholders in the codes' effectiveness8.10. Tools for more effective monitoring by shareholders; 8.10.1. Making room for a more continuous dialogue; 8.10.2. Organising the role of institutional investors; 8.10.3. Engagement and stewardship; 8.11. External monitoring by the corporate governance commissions; 8.11.1. Nature and role of the corporate governance monitoring commissions; 8.11.2. Monitoring tools; 8.12. Is there a need for further harmonisation?; 9. Recommendations; References; 3 Restructuring in family firms: a tale of two crises; 1. Introduction.