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131123s2013 enk o 000 0 eng d |
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|a EBLCP
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|a 862126157
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|a 9781107419971
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|a 1107419972
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|a 9781139629126
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|a 1139629123
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|a 9781107040564
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|a 1107040566
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|a DEBSZ
|b 44598659X
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|b 000055933049
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|a (OCoLC)863821741
|z (OCoLC)862126157
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|a e------
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|a HD2741 .B63 2013
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|a 338.6/1094
|a 338.61094
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|a UAMI
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|a Belcredi, Massimo.
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|a Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies :
|b Facts, Context and Post-Crisis Reforms.
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|a Cambridge :
|b Cambridge University Press,
|c 2013.
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|a 1 online resource (454 pages)
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
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|a International Corporate Law and Financial Market Regulation
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|a Cover; Foreword; Contents; Figures; Tables; Contributors; 1 Corporate boards, incentive pay and shareholder activism in Europe: main issues and policy perspectives; 1. Introduction; 1.1. Purpose and scope; 1.2. EU reform; 1.2.1. After Enron; 1.2.2. The recent financial crisis; 1.3. Varieties of corporate governance; 1.3.1. Shareholder v. stakeholder governance; 1.3.2. Bank governance; 2. Controlling agency costs; 2.1. Market solutions; 2.2. Corporate law; 2.3. 'Comply or explain'; 2.4. Bank prudential regulation; 3. Ownership; 3.1. Dispersed v. concentrated ownership.
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|a 3.2. The case of family firms4. Boards; 4.1. Theory; 4.2. Practice; 4.3. Empirical analysis; 4.4. Limits of a quantitative approach; 5. Incentive pay; 5.1. Two views; 5.2. Non-financial firms; 5.3. Financial institutions (banks in particular); 5.4. Empirical analysis; 6. Shareholder activism; 6.1. Types and role of activism; 6.2. Regulatory impact and reform proposals; 6.2.1. Shareholder rights; 6.2.2. Shareholder powers; 6.2.3. Reform proposals; 6.3. Empirical analysis; 6.3.1. Management and shareholder proposals; 6.3.2. The Italian slate voting system; 7. Policy; 7.1. Board structures.
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|a 7.2. Directors' remuneration7.3. Shareholder activism; 7.4. 'Comply or explain'; 7.5. The Action Plan; 8. Concluding remarks; References; 2 European corporate governance codes and their effectiveness; 1. Implementation and enforcement of corporate governance codes; 2. Relationship of the corporate governance codes with the legal environment; 3. Implementation of corporate governance codes; 4. Measuring implementation of corporate governance codes; 5. Drivers for implementation; 6. The scope; 7. Comparative country analysis; 7.1. Austria; 7.2. Belgium; 7.3. Denmark; 7.4. France; 7.5. Germany.
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|a 7.6. Italy7.7. Luxembourg; 7.8. The Netherlands; 7.8.1 The corporate governance code; 7.8.2 Other corporate governance recommendations; 7.8.3. Dutch case law; 7.9. Portugal; 7.10. Spain; 7.11. Sweden; 7.12. Switzerland; 7.13. UK; 8. Preliminary findings; 8.1. The public or private character of the codes; 8.2. The double-layered system; 8.3. Comply or explain; 8.4. How to measure effectiveness; 8.5. The codes versus hard law; 8.6. Drafting the codes; 8.7. Observing the adoption and the application of the code; 8.8. Disclosing names.
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|a 8.9. The general role of the shareholders in the codes' effectiveness8.10. Tools for more effective monitoring by shareholders; 8.10.1. Making room for a more continuous dialogue; 8.10.2. Organising the role of institutional investors; 8.10.3. Engagement and stewardship; 8.11. External monitoring by the corporate governance commissions; 8.11.1. Nature and role of the corporate governance monitoring commissions; 8.11.2. Monitoring tools; 8.12. Is there a need for further harmonisation?; 9. Recommendations; References; 3 Restructuring in family firms: a tale of two crises; 1. Introduction.
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|a 2. Literature, hypotheses development and policy issues.
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|a Is European Corporate Governance really dysfunctional? An analysis of European reform proposals based on new, comparative evidence.
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|a Print version record.
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|a ProQuest Ebook Central
|b Ebook Central Academic Complete
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650 |
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|a Corporate governance
|z Europe.
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650 |
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|a Boards of directors
|z Europe.
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650 |
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|a Stockholders
|z Europe.
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650 |
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|a Gouvernement d'entreprise
|z Europe.
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650 |
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|a Conseils d'administration
|z Europe.
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650 |
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|a Boards of directors
|2 fast
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650 |
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|a Corporate governance
|2 fast
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650 |
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|a Stockholders
|2 fast
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|a Europe
|2 fast
|1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJxCxPbbk4CPJDQJb4r6rq
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700 |
1 |
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|a Ferrarini, Guido.
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758 |
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|i has work:
|a Boards and shareholders in European listed companies (Text)
|1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGy7VTjkMFtjQ4FcFGdQpX
|4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork
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776 |
0 |
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|i Print version:
|a Belcredi, Massimo.
|t Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies : Facts, Context and Post-Crisis Reforms.
|d Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, ©2013
|z 9781107040564
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830 |
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0 |
|a International corporate law and financial market regulation.
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856 |
4 |
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|u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1394589
|z Texto completo
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938 |
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|a Askews and Holts Library Services
|b ASKH
|n AH26386084
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938 |
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|a ProQuest Ebook Central
|b EBLB
|n EBL1394589
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938 |
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|a YBP Library Services
|b YANK
|n 11228104
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|a YBP Library Services
|b YANK
|n 12630576
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|a 92
|b IZTAP
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