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Collection of Surveys on Market Experiments.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell,
2013.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- A Collection of Surveys on Market Experiments; CONTENTS; 1 A COLLECTION OF SURVEYS ON MARKET EXPERIMENTS; References; 2 EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKETS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS; 1. Introduction; 2. Experimental Gift-Exchange Labor Markets; 2.1 Common Features Across Experiments; 2.2 Fundamental Results; 2.3 Gift-Exchange Labor Markets and Policy Instruments; 2.4 Robustness and Extensions of Gift-Exchange Labor Markets; 2.5 Summary; 3. Experimental Labor Markets in Macroeconomics and Public Finance; 4. Conclusions; Notes; References.
- 3 PRICE DYNAMICS IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EXPERIMENTS1. Introduction; 2. Price Dynamics in Laboratory Exchange Economies; 2.1 Across-Period Dynamics; 2.2 Within-Period Dynamics; 3. Further Experimental GE Applications; Acknowledgements; Notes; References; 4 OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS IN THE CURRENT MILLENNIUM; 1. Introduction; 2. Oligopoly Competition from a Static Perspective; 2.1 Simultaneous-Move Quantity and Price Competition; 2.2 Sequential-Move Games, Timing and Commitment; 2.3 Innovation and Competition; 2.4 Price Dispersion; 3. Dynamics, (non- )Convergence, and Learning Processes.
- 3.1 Stability and Convergence of Cournot Markets3.2 Cycles under Price Competition; 3.3 Feedback, Information and Learning Processes; 4. Collusion and Policy; 4.1 Tacit Collusion; 4.2 Cartels and Competition Policy; 4.3 Regulation; 5. Concluding Remarks; Acknowledgements; Notes; References; 5 MULTIUNIT AUCTIONS; 1. Introduction; 2. Multiunit Auctions, Single-Unit Demand; 2.1 Comparison of Auction Formats Motivated by Spectrum Sales; 2.2 Other Single-Unit Demand Auctions; 3. Multiunit Demand, No Synergies; 3.1 Demand Reduction under Uniform-Price Auctions and Institutional Remedies.
- 3.2 Extensions to Asymmetric Bidders and Common Values4. Synergies and Package Bidding; 4.1 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Auctions; 4.2 Exposure and Threshold Problems; 4.3 Comparison of Alternative Auction Mechanisms; 5. Role of Specific Institutional Features; 5.1 Bid Withdrawal and Eligibility Rules; 5.2 Ending Rules; 5.3 Jump Bidding; 6. Collusion; 6.1 Collusion with Explicit Communication; 6.2 Tacit Collusion; 7. Sequential Bidding; 7.1 Auction Formats and Sequencing of Sales; 7.2 Price Trends in Sequential Auctions; 8. Conclusions and Open Questions.
- 8.1 Comparison of Auction Formats and Alternative Mechanisms8.2 Asymmetric Bidders, Entry, and Competition among Auctions; 8.3 Behavioral Models of Bidding; Acknowledgements; Notes; References; 6 OVERBIDDING AND HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR IN CONTEST EXPERIMENTS; 1. Introduction; 2. A Simple Contest Model; 3. Experimental Findings on Contests; 4. Overbidding in Contests; 4.1 Bounded Rationality; 4.2 Utility of Winning; 4.3 Other-Regarding Preferences; 4.4 Probability Distortion; 4.5 The Shape of the Payoff Function; 4.6 How to Reduce Overbidding; 5. Heterogeneous Behavior in Contests.