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Consciousness and Perceptual Experience : an Ecological and Phenomenological Approach.
An unusual study of human perceiving from the perspective of an ecological psychology that explicitly incorporates a phenomenology of consciousness.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2013.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Chapter 1 Introduction: concepts of consciousness; I. The concept of consciousness1: an interpersonal cognitive relation; II. The concept of consciousness2: the intrapersonal together sense; III. The concept of consciousness3: being occurently aware of anything; IV. The concept of consciousness4: the inner-awareness meaning; V. The concept of consciousness5: the unitive meaning; VI. The concept of consciousness6: the general-state meaning; Chapter 2 Skepticism regarding consciousness; I.A certain prominent and persistent effort to debunk; II. The wish to suppress the subjective.
- III. William James's own skepticismIV. More about both of our sciousness theorists; V. Argumentation pro and con around the main issue; VI. The self of all the other selves; VII. A behavioristic move; Chapter 3 The normal waking state; I. Identification of the target; II. The question of joint ownership; III. Simplification not advisable; IV. An irenic approach instead?; V. Sharing the one and only world; VI. Sharing the science; VII. A bridge to the world; VIII. The world ""does"" something too; IX. A requisite aside; X. An inadequate photic metaphor; XI. Locations and dislocations.
- XII. Consciousness6 generated experiential flowXIII. Much more than its inner side; XIV. The intentionality problem; Chapter 4 Contact with the world; I. An opposing internalist view; II. A world-contact thesis with inner awareness; III. Is perceiving systematically illusional?; IV. A counterclaim of illusion; V. An alternative interpretation; VI. Still looking out the window; VII. Before returning to the world-contact thesis; VIII. Return to world-contact thesis; IX. An opposing non-internalist view; X. Outer presentations purportedly mediate; XI. Perceptual presence and its interpretation.
- XII. Being and appearancesXIII. Ubiquitous self-disclosure; XIV. Two kinds of seeing; XV. Constituents of perceptual experience; XVI. Experience wittingly apprehended; Chapter 5 Environment; I. The consciousness involved in perceiving; II. We parts of the ecological environment; III. Among what we do not perceive; IV. The objects of perception: other worlds as candidates; V. Perceptual awareness always environmental; VI. Towards an improved view; VII. Conflicting descriptions of the single existing world; Chapter 6 The life-world; I. By way of preparation.
- II. On the phenomenological aspect of perceivingIII. To raise psychologists ́ consciousness; IV. To include the unperceivable features; V. In reply to a likely objection; VI. As to what is objective after all; VII. Experiencing items in their own proper being; VIII. To speak of worlds or just one world; IX. Reason to investigate the life-world as such; X.A contrast to Husserl ́s approach; XI. To conjecture a different world than the life-world?; XII. The life-world versus a mental representation thereof; XIII. What it is for the life-world to be pregiven.