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Property possession as identity : an essay in metaphysics /
In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Frankfurt :
Ontos Verlag,
2011.
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| Colección: | Philosophische Analyse ;
Bd. 41. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- CHAPTER I; INTRODUCTION; 1. A long-neglected dispute between Plato and Aristotle. 1; 2. The account to be defended.; 3. Some potential misconceptions about my account.; 4. The highly metaphorical nature of other accounts.; 5. An historical precedent for my account.; 6. The plan.; 7. Some methodological points about my account.; 8. Some methodological points about the problem my account solves.; 9. A theory of properties.; 9.1. What is it for something to be a property?; 9.2. What are the existence-conditions for properties?; 9.3. What are the individuation-conditions for properties?
- AGAINST INTERNALISM1. Introduction.; CHAPTER II; 2. Against Paul's view.; 3. Against Denkel's view.; 4. The view of Aristotle.; 5. Against Internalism in general.; CHAPTER III; AGAINST EXTERNALISM; 1. Introduction.; 2. Against Predicate Nominalism.; 3. Against Concept Nominalism.; 4. Against Class Nominalism.; 5. Against Resemblance Nominalism.; 5.1. Rodriguez-Pereyra's version of the view.; 5.2. The mind-dependence of resemblance.; 5.3. The argument.; 6. Against Traditional Externalism.; 7. Against Externalism in general.; CHAPTER IV; THE VIEW OF PLATO; 1. Introduction.
- 2. Plato's view for sensible things. 3. A novel interpretation of Plato's theory of forms.; 4. Plato on the self predication of the forms.; 5. Plato and the third man.; 6. Evaluation of Plato's view.; CHAPTER V; AGAINST HYBRID VIEWS; 1. Introduction.; 2. Against the view of Armstrong.; 3. Against the view of Zalta.; 4. Against hybrid views in general.; 5. Against Baxter's view.; CHAPTER VI; PROPERTY POSSESSION AS IDENTITY; 1. Introduction.; 2. Premise one:; 3. Premise two:; 4. Premise three:; 5. Premise four:; CHAPTER VII; OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; 1. Introduction.; 2. The nature of an entity.
- 3. N and its truth. 4. Objections and replies.; 4.1. The many over the one.; 4.2. The one over the many.; 4.3. Property possession and predication.; 4.4. The 'is' of predication and the 'is' of identity.; 4.5. My account and change.; 4.6. My account and modality.; 4.7. A world of properties alone.; 5. The substratum versus the bundle theories.; 6. The problem of property-unification.; 7. The problem of the principle of individuation.; BIBLIOGRAPHY.