Cargando…

E-physicalism : a physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness /

This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels "e-physicalism". Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that conscious...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Bernal Velásquez, Reinaldo J.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag, ©2012.
Colección:Phenomenology & mind ; Bd. 14.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • TABLE OF CONTENTS; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS; INTRODUCTION; CHAPTER 1: A PHYSICALIST APPROACH TO CONSCIOUSNESS; 1.0 Introduction; 1.1 Consciousness and "what it is like"; 1.2 Realism about consciousness; 1.2.1 Eliminativism; 1.2.2 The problem of consciousness; 1.3 Physicalism about consciousness; 1.3.1 Physical items; 1.3.2 Supervenience; 1.4 The mind/body duality; 1.5 Minds and bodies; 1.5.1 Mind-body causal relations; 1.5.2 Epiphenomenalism; 1.5.3 Monism; 1.6 Panpsychism; 1.6.1 The combination problem; 1.6.2 Panpsychism and neuroscience; 1.7 Conclusion; CHAPTER 2: STRONG AI AND COMPUTATIONALISM.
  • 2.0 Introduction2.1 Strong AI; 2.1.1 Conscious behaviour; 2.1.2 Consciousness and behaviour; 2.2 Computational functionalism; 2.2.1 Functionalism and consciousness; 2.2.2 Functions and information; 2.3 The internal character of consciousness; 2.4 Conclusion; CHAPTER 3: SUBJECTIVITY AND THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS; 3.0 Introduction; 3.1 Higher-order representation theories of consciousness; 3.2 The unity of consciousness; 3.3 The explanatory gap; 3.3.1 Subjectivity and reality; 3.3.2 Intersubjective accessibility; 3.4 The homunculus fallacy; 3.5 Conclusion.
  • CHAPTER 4: SUPERVENIENCE, EMERGENCE, AND ONTOLOGICAL NOVELTY4.0 Introduction; 4.1 Supervenience and ontology; 4.2 Consciousness and supervenience; 4.3 Microphysicalism; 4.4 The levels of reality; 4.5 Emergence; 4.6 The case for emergence; 4.6.1 The kinetic theory of gases; 4.6.2 The EPR Paradox and Bell's theorem; 4.6.3 Microphysicalism and nonlocality; 4.7 Emergence laws; 4.8 Conclusion; CHAPTER 5: E-PHYSICALISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS; 5.0 Introduction; 5.1 Experiencers; 5.2 The possible worlds strategy; 5.2.1 Physical and metaphysical possibility; 5.2.2 The conceivability of possible worlds.
  • 5.3 Metaphysical zombies5.4 Kim's "supervenience argument"; 5.5 Conclusion; CHAPTER 6: E-PHYSICALISM AND PHENOMENAL QUALITIES; 6.0 Introduction; 6.1 Vehicles and content
  • an analogy; 6.2 Phenomenal content and representational content; 6.2.1 One vehicle, different contents; 6.2.2 One content, different vehicles; 6.2.3 Nonrepresentational phenomenal contents; 6.3 Phenomenal character and physical states; 6.3.1 Phenomenal character and biological functions; 6.3.2 Phenomenal space; 6.4 The knowledge argument; 6.4.1 Mary does not acquire new knowledge; 6.4.2 The ability hypothesis.
  • 6.4.3 The limits of scientific knowledge6.5 Conclusion; CONCLUSION; REFERENCES.