Austrian Phenomenology : Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object.
While many of the phenomenological currents in philosophy allegedly utilize a peculiar method, the type under consideration here is characterized by Franz Brentano's ambition to make philosophy scientific by adopting no other method but that of natural science. Brentano became particularly infl...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Berlin :
De Gruyter,
2008.
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Colección: | Phenomenology & mind.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- INTRODUCTION; 1. The Subject Matter of Austrian Phenomenology; 2. The Method of Austrian Phenomenology; 3. Austrian Phenomenology and Philosophy; 4. Major Figures of Austrian Phenomenology; BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON IMAGINATION; 1. Introduction; 2. Brentano on Imagination; 3. Husserl on Imagination; 3.1. Methodological Considerations; 3.2. Presentations; 3.3. Sensations and Phantasms; 3.4. The Phantasy Image; 3.5. Phantasy Presentations as Intuitive; 3.6. Critique of the Doctrine of Original Association; 4. Conclusion; NAMES, STATEMENTS, AND MIND-FUNCTIONS IN HUSSERL'S LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS.
- 1. Introduction2. Manifestation, Meaning, and Reference; 3. Positing Names and Non-Positing Statements; 4. Excursus: Inner Perception in the Logical Investigations; 5. Fulfillment of Names and Statements; 6. Concluding Remarks; MARTY ON LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS AND MIND-FUNCTIONS; 1. Introduction; 2. Ontological Requirements; 3. Mind-Functions in Correlation with Linguistic Expressions; 4. Mentalism and Introspectionism; 5. Conclusion; HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC: THE 1896 LECTURES IN THEIR NINETEENTH CENTURY CONTEXT; 1. Introduction; 3. Logic as Theory of Science; 3. Concepts; 4. Propositions.
- 5. Inferences6. Conclusion; MEINONG ON THE OBJECTS OF SENSATION; 1. Introduction; 2. Brentano on Sensory Contents; 3. From Physical Phenomena to Objects of Sensation; 4. Sensory Objects of Higher Order; 5. The Nonexistence of Sensory Objects; 6. A Priori Knowledge about Sensory Objects; 7. Comparison with Stumpf; 8. Comparison with Husserl; 9. Conclusion; STUMPF ON PHENOMENA AND PHENOMENOLOGY; 1. Introduction; 2. Phenomena; 3. Phenomenology; 4. Conclusion; BRENTANO AND MEINONG; 1. Introduction; 2. Points of Divergence; 2.1. Theory of Relations; 2.2. Intensity.
- 2.3. Immediate Evidence of Surmise2.4. Feeling and Desire; 2.5. Content and Object; 2.6. Judgments; 2.7. Presentations; 2.8. Time-Consciousness; 2.9. Assumptions; 2.10. Object Theory; 2.11. Value Theory; 2.12. Phenomena and Consciousness; 3. Philosophical Affinity; HUSSERL AND CORNELIUS: PHENOMENOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND EPISTEMOLOGY; 1. Introduction; 2. Hans Cornelius (1863-1947); 3. Husserl's Critique of Attempt at a Theory of Existential Judgments; 3.1 Various Types of Problems concerning Judgments; 3.2 Perceiving and Distinguishing; 3.3 Content, Object, and Meaning.
- 3.4 Phantasms and Sensations3.5 Memory Images; 3.6. Negation; 4. Husserl's Critique of Psychology as an Experiential Science; 4.1 The Principle of Thought Economy; 4.2 Abstraction and General Ideas; 4.3 The Experiential Origin of Universally Valid Judgments; 5. Cornelius' Reply and Correspondence with Husserl; 5.1 Psychology and Epistemology; 5.2 Correspondence; 5.3. The Subject Matter of Phenomenology; 6. Conclusion; MEINONG ON PERCEPTION AND OBJECTIVES; AUSTRIAN THEORIES OF JUDGMENT: BOLZANO, BRENTANO, MEINONG, AND HUSSERL; 1. Introduction; 2. Bolzano; 3. Brentano; 4. Meinong; 5. Husserl.