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Naturalism and the first-person perspective /
This text investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the w...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford, U.K. ; New York, NY :
Oxford University Press,
©2013.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- What is the Problem?
- PART I: THE CORE ARGUMENT
- 1. Varieties of Naturalism
- What Counts As "Science"?
- Reductive Naturalism
- Nonreductive Naturalism
- Two Responses to Naturalism: Disenchantment and Optimism
- 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective
- What Is Naturalization?
- The Robust First-Person Perspective
- The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective
- 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
- John Perry and an Epistemic Account of the Self
- David Lewis on De Se Belief
- A Comment on John Searle
- Does Cognitive Science Save the Day for Naturalism?
- Conclusion
- 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
- Daniel Dennett on Consciousness
- Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory
- My Recommendation
- 5. Arguments against First-Person Naturalization
- From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties
- A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties
- A Metaphysical Argument against Ontological Naturalism
- Conclusion
- PART II: AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
- 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective
- The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
- Language and the Acquisition of Concepts
- How to Acquire a Self-Concept
- Human Persons: Wrap Up
- 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent?
- Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach
- Objections and Replies
- Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory
- Johnston's Critique Sidestepped
- Conclusion
- 8. A Metaphysical Framework for the First-Person Perspective
- First-Person Properties
- Dispositional Properties
- Haecceitistic Implications
- Conclusion.
- 9 Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-Person Perspective
- Personhood
- Varieties of Agency
- Artifacts
- Moral Responsibility
- Conclusion
- 10. Natural Reality
- Near-Naturalism
- Property-Constitution and Causation
- Emergentism and Downward Causation
- How Naturalistic Is Near-Naturalism?
- Bibliography
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- V
- W
- Z.