Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics : the Myth of Neutrality.

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Adolph illustrates the policy differences between central banks run by former bankers relative to those run by bureaucrats.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Adolph, Christopher
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Colección:Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
Temas:
Banks and banking, Central > Political aspects.
Bureaucracy.
Monetary policy.
Banques centrales > Aspect politique.
Bureaucratie.
Politique monétaire.
Banks and banking, Central > Political aspects
Bureaucracy
Monetary policy
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance
  • Career theories of monetary policy
  • Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies
  • Careers and the monetary policy process: three mechanism tests
  • Careers and inflation in developing countries
  • How central bankers use their independence
  • Partisan governments, labor unions and monetary policy
  • The politics of central banker appointment
  • The politics of central banker tenure
  • Conclusion: the dilemma of discretion.

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