Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics : the Myth of Neutrality.
Adolph illustrates the policy differences between central banks run by former bankers relative to those run by bureaucrats.
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
---|---|
Autor principal: | Adolph, Christopher |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2013.
|
Colección: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
|
Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
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