Corporate governance in the common-law world : the political foundations of shareholder power /

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Presents a new comparative theory to explain the divergence between governance systems of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Bruner, Christopher M., 1972- (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Temas:
Corporate governance > Law and legislation.
Common law.
Stockholders > Legal status, laws, etc.
LAW > Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice.
Gouvernance d'entreprise.
Jurisprudence.
Droit des sociétés.
Droit des affaires.
Actionnaires.
Sociétés anonymes.
Common law
Corporate governance > Law and legislation
Law.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • List of Figures; Acknowledgments; Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; Part I Shareholder Orientation in the Common-Law World; 1 Introduction and Overview; 2 Comparative Theory and Corporate Governance; A. Functionalism and Contextualism; B. Failing Better; 3 The Corporate Governance Role of Shareholders in Common-Law Jurisdictions; A. The U.K. Model: Strong Shareholders; I. Shareholders as Stewards; II. Enlightened Shareholder Value; III. Contractualism and U.K. Corporate Governance; B. The U.S. Model: Weak Shareholders; I. Shareholders as Spectators.
  • II. Ambivalence Regarding Shareholder InterestsIII. Prevailing Theories of U.S. Corporate Governance; C. Predominance of the U.K. Corporate Governance Model; I. Australia; II. Canada; D. Shareholder Lawsuits and Corporate Governance; Part II A Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; 4 Comparative Theories of Corporate Governance; A. Economics; B. Politics; I. "Law Matters"; II. Social Democracy; III. Institutions; IV. "Varieties of Capitalism" and Institutional Complementarities; V. Coalitions; VI. Political Parties and Political Salience.
  • VII. Extra-Corporate Stakeholder ProtectionsC. Toward a Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; 5 Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Social Welfare Policy; A. The U.K. Model: State-Based Social Welfare Policy; B. The U.S. Model: Employer-Based Social Welfare Policy; C. Predominance of the U.K. Social Welfare Model; I. Australia; II. Canada; D. Shareholder Orientation, Social Welfare, and Political Equilibrium; Part III The Theory's Explanatory Domain; 6 Stability, Change, and the Future of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; A. Mapping the Explanatory Domain.
  • B. The Evolving Shareholder BaseC. Postcrisis Austerity; D. Postcrisis Coalitions; 7 Conclusions; Index.

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