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Constructing International Security : Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard.

3 Time Consistency and Entrapment; Emboldenment and Entrapment; A Theory of Third-Party Intervention and Moral Hazard; Baseline Conflict Bargaining Model; Model with Third-Party Intervention; Applications; Summary; 4 Evidence of Moral Hazard in Military Alliances; The Relationship between Military A...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Benson, Brett V., 1973-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover; Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Understanding the Design of Security Commitments; The Content of Commitments; Characterizing Ambiguity as Probabilistic Commitment; Why Ambiguity?; Overview of the Argument; Outline of the Book; 2 A Typology of Third-Party Commitments; Third-Party Security Commitments in International Relations; Alliances and Third-Party Commitments; Problems Categorizing Alliances; New Typology of Alliances; Compellent Commitments; Deterrent Commitments.
  • Model of Conditional and Unconditional CommitmentExtension to Unobservable Actions; Implications; 6 Testing the Implications for Alliance Design; Foreign Policy Preferences; Capabilities of the Third Party; Capabilities of the Protégé; Contiguity and Hidden Actions; Research Design and Data; Empirical Analysis; Summary; 7 Deterrent Commitments in East Asia; Hidden Actions and Commitment Design; Content of the Commitments; Deterrence and Control in Postwar Japan; Revisionism in the ROC and Neutralizing the Taiwan Strait; Revisionist ROK and Conditional Commitments.
  • From Conditional to Probabilistic DeterrenceWhy a Probabilistic Commitment?; Comparing the ROC with the ROK; Summary; 8 Constructing Security in Todays World; Summarizing How Commitments Manage Deterrence and Moral Hazard; Strategic Ambiguity in Taiwan; Chinas Alliance with North Korea; Summary; References; Index.