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An Essay on Philosophical Method.

James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro present a new edition of R.G. Collingwood's classic work of 1933, supplementing the original text with important related writings from Collingwood's manuscripts which appear here for the first time. The editors also contribute a substantial new intr...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Connelly, James (Editor ), D'Oro, Giuseppina (Editor )
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford University Press 2005.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • ABBREVIATIONS
  • EDITORS' INTRODUCTION
  • SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
  • AN ESSAY ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
  • I. INTRODUCTION
  • 1. THE PROBLEM
  • 1. Philosophy must raise the question what philosophy is
  • 2. Three suggested ways of approaching this question
  • 3. The way to be followed here: an account of philosophical method
  • 4. Importance of this subject at the present time
  • 2. THE METHOD
  • 5. Necessity of restricting the subject under discussion
  • 6. Significance of the comparison between philosophical and scientific thought
  • 3. HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
  • 7. Socrates.
  • 8 . Plato
  • 9. Descartes
  • 10. Kant
  • II. THE OVERLAP OF CLASSES
  • 1. THE THEORY OF CLASSIFICATION IN FORMAL LOGIC
  • 1. The traditional theory of classification
  • 2. Its application in exact (mathematical) science
  • 3. Its application in empirical science
  • 2. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF APPLYING IT RIGIDLY TO PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS
  • 4. Specific classes here overlap one another
  • 5. This fact long recognized in certain cases
  • 6. The case of concepts having a philosophical and a nonphilosophical phase
  • 7. The overlap of classes in logic
  • 8. The overlap of classes in ethics.
  • 15. Corollaries of this rule. (a) The object of philosophical thought cannot be a classificatory system
  • 16. (b) Nor yet an aggregate, i.e. a whole of separable parts
  • 17. These corollaries to be understood only as warnings against unadvisedly assuming the opposite
  • III. THE SCALE OF FORMS
  • 1. PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE IDEA
  • 1. The species of a philosophical genus do not differ merely in degree
  • 2. Nor merely in kind
  • 3. Philosophy is interested in cases where these two are combined
  • 4. The scale of forms: its place in the history of philosophy.
  • 5. Such scales occur both in philosophy and elsewhere
  • 6. But in a philosophical scale of forms the variable is identical with the generic essence
  • 2. TWO DIFFICULTIES
  • 7. (i) This identification seems nonsensical
  • 8. (ii) The scale, as hitherto described, accounts only for an overlap between opposites, not distincts
  • 9. It would follow that philosophical specification is by opposition, non-philosophical by distinction
  • 10. Consequences of this. It disintegrates a philosophical scale of forms, requiring us to jettison all intermediate terms and keep only the extremes.