Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics.
Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics offers a highly distinctive and original approach to the metaphysics of death and applies this approach to contemporary debates in bioethics that address end-of-life and post-mortem issues. Taylor defends the controversial Epicurean view that death is not a harm...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
---|---|
Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Hoboken :
Taylor and Francis,
2012.
|
Colección: | Routledge annals of bioethics.
|
Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Death Unterrible; Full-blooded Epicureanism and Contemporary Bioethics; A Note on Methodology; Outline of this Volume; 1 Posthumous Harm and Interest-based Accounts of Well-being; The Intuitive Case for Posthumous Harm; The Anti-Hedonistic Intuition; Wronging the Dead; The Feinberg-Pitcher Argument for Posthumous Harm; Assessing the Argument for Posthumous Harm; Accommodating Orphaned Intuitions; Accommodating Feinberg's and Parfit's Anti-Hedonistic Intuitions; Can the Dead be Wronged?
- Portmore, Posthumous Harm, and the Desire Theory of WelfareConclusion; 2 Further Criticisms of the Possibility of Posthumous Harm; Levenbook's Account of Harm as Loss; Levenbook's Argument; Criticisms of Levenbook's Argument; Grover's Quality of Life Arguments; Grover's Argument; Criticisms of Grover's Argument; Sperling's Human Subject Account; Sperling's Argument; Criticisms of Sperling's Argument; Harm and Implication in Evil; Conclusion; 3 The Impossibility of Posthumous Harm; Death, Goods, and the Extinction of Desires; Responding to Luper; Towards Hedonism; Objects and Causes
- Conclusion4 Can the Dead Be Wronged?; Desert and Injustice; Blustein and the "Dear Departed"; Responses to Blustein's Arguments; Response to the Rescue from Insignificance Argument; Response to the Enduring Duties Argument; Response to the Reciprocity Argument; Rights and Interests; Conclusion; 5 Why Death Is Not a Harm to the One Who Dies; The Epicurean Argument; Hedonism Revisited; Death and Deprivation; Does a Person's Death Deprive Her of the Goods of Life?; Responses to these Deprivation-based Arguments for the Harm of Death; The Existence Variant and Presentism Defended; Conclusion
- 6 Fearless SymmetryLucretian Arguments; Challenges to the Lucretian Symmetry Argument; Responses to Nagel's Objection; Stoic fate; Hetherington's Symmetry Arguments; Earlier Birth and Personal Identity; Kaufman's Defense of Nagel's Argument; Responses to Kaufman; Responses to the Other Criticisms of this Lucretian Argument; The Backfire Problem; Feldman's Objection; Parfit's Hospital Example; Conclusion; 7 Epicureanism, Suicide, and Euthanasia; McMahan's Reconciliation Strategy; An Epicurean Approach to Suicide and Euthanasia; Suicide; Euthanasia; Conclusion
- 8 Epicureanism and Organ ProcurementEpicureanism and Policies of Presumed Consent; Presumed Consent and the "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Gill's Arguments; Why Gill's Argument against the Qualitative "Fewer Mistakes" Argument Fails; Objections to Gill's Quantitative Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Argument; The "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments and Violations of Autonomy; Presumed Consent and Respect for Autonomy; From Presumed Consent to Organ Taking; The Standard Pro-Taking Argument; Two Unjustified Assumptions-Moving Towards Markets