The limits of détente : the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1969-1973 /

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In this analysis of the origins of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Craig Daigle draws on documents only recently made available to show how the war resulted not only from tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also from policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Daigle, Craig (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New Haven : Yale University Press, ©2012.
Temas:
Cold War.
Arab-Israeli conflict.
Guerre froide.
Conflit israélo-arabe.
HISTORY > Middle East > General.
HISTORY > Middle East > Israel.
Arab-Israeli conflict
Diplomatic relations
Middle East > Foreign relations > United States.
United States > Foreign relations > Middle East.
United States > Foreign relations > Soviet Union.
Soviet Union > Foreign relations > United States.
Moyen-Orient > Relations extérieures > États-Unis.
États-Unis > Relations extérieures > Moyen-Orient.
États-Unis > Relations extérieures > URSS.
URSS > Relations extérieures > États-Unis.
Middle East
Soviet Union
United States
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • From confrontation to negotiation, January-September 1969
  • The Rogers plan, October-December 1969
  • The first Soviet threat, January-May 1970
  • Crisis on the Suez, June-September 1970
  • Fighting for Sadat, October 1970-August 1971
  • The race to the summit, September 1971-May 1972
  • Bombshells and back channels, June 1972-February 1973
  • The contradictions of Leonid Brezhnev, March-October 1973
  • The crisis of détente, October 1973.

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