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The Power of American Governors : Winning on Budgets and Losing on Policy.
Governors can be powerful actors in the lawmaking process, but what they're bargaining over shapes their strategy and effectiveness.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; The Power of American Governors: Winning on Budgets and Losing on Policy; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Acknowledgments; 1 One Problem Shared by 50 Governors; 1.1 States as Laboratories for the Study of Executive Power; 1.2 How We View Governors; 1.3 How We Explore the Powers of Governors; 1.3.1 Two New Data Sets; 1.3.2 Natural Experimental Case Studies; 1.3.3 Interviews and Qualitative Evidence; 1.4 Unveiling the Hidden Powers of American Governors; 1.4.1 The Puzzle of Weak Governors: Revisiting the Determinants of State Policy.
- 1.4.2 Policy versus Budget Games: The Empirical Implications of a Theoretical Distinction1.4.3 Can Governors Cash In Their Political Capital? First and Second Glances at Popularity; 1.5 Organization of the Book; 2 The Roots of Executive Power; 2.1 Two Different Games That Governors Play; 2.2 The Policy Game; 2.2.1 What Do Governors and Legislators Want?; 2.2.2 What Do Governors and Legislators Know?; 2.2.3 The Power of the Veto Pen; 2.2.4 The Power of Small Favors; 2.2.5 Powers Erode over Time; 2.2.6 Power Grows with Popularity; 2.2.7 The Implicit Stakes of a High-Profile Policy Proposal.
- 2.2.8 The Payoff of Position Taking2.2.9 The Legislature's Goals and Tactics; 2.2.10 The Logic That Drives the Game; 2.3 The Budget Game; 2.3.1 Which Governors Perform Best in Budget Bargaining?; 2.3.2 Governors Can Wait to Secure Their Legacies; 2.3.3 Governors Can Outwait Part-Time Legislatures; 2.4 Can Governors Accomplish Their Policy Goals through the Budget?; 2.5 Conclusion; 2.6 Appendix; 3 What Do Governors Propose?; 3.1 Coding State of the State Addresses; 3.2 What Did Governors Ask For?; 3.3 Agendas and Bargaining Circumstances; 3.4 Agendas and Gubernatorial Partisanship.
- 3.5 Conclusion3.6 Appendix; 4 Gubernatorial Success; 4.1 Tracking Gubernatorial Proposals; 4.2 Baseline Measures of Gubernatorial Success; 4.3 Determinants of Success; 4.3.1 Budgetary versus Policy Proposals; 4.3.2 Bargaining Patience; 4.3.3 Ideological Agreement; 4.3.4 Side Payments; 4.3.5 Position-Taking Bonus; 4.3.6 Features of the Proposal and Agenda; 4.3.7 State Fiscal Health; 4.3.8 The Empirical Importance of Two Bargaining Models; 4.4 Summary; 4.5 Appendix; 5 Do Governors Set the Size of Government?; 5.1 Competing Models of Budget Bargaining.
- 5.2 Measuring Governors' Proposals and Legislative Enactments5.3 What Do Governors Ask for, and Why?; 5.4 Evaluating Competing Models; 5.5 Disentangling Session Length from Salary and Staff; 5.6 Conclusion; 5.7 Appendix; 6 The Power and Perils of Popularity; 6.1 What Hurricanes and Scandals Teach Us about Political Capital; 6.1.1 A First Look at Gubernatorial Success: Batting Averages; 6.2 Why Popularity Shapes Both Agendas and Success; 6.3 A Closer Look at Gubernatorial Success: Agendas and Weighted Success; 6.3.1 Hurricane Katrina Natural Experiment; 6.3.2 Ohio's Coingate Scandal.